Marek Vermin (MV): We’ve been around since 2001, but we’ve been through a number of line-ups. The only members of the band that have been with us since the beginning are myself and Casey. The band was founded as a collective, but lots of bands say that and no one ever seems to know what exactly that means. We were the same. It was basically a position about our ideological stance. A loose consensus was the formula for band decisions, but there was no formal structure with a constitution or anything.

We have always been involved in community-building and resistance movements, so we’ve played a lot of benefits, like Rock Against Racism, Rock For Choice, an Anti-G8 benefit, Rock Against Tuition, and have been involved with promoting concerts to help fund worker co-ops and community initiatives. We keep meaning to tour outside of North America, which is our stomping grounds, but we can never seem to be able to afford it. Until recently, the band had six members (we’re now five), so flying that many people off continent is super expensive. Additionally, Canada’s arts funding group, FACTOR, used to provide tour grants to help bands get out, but now they are almost impossible to get because big artists like Nickleback or some shit are scoring all of the funding. So we have been hoping to get to the Philippines for a long time, but we have to wait until the right time when we can afford to get there on our own. I have been involved in research and activism dealing with international issues for a long time, so actually being in the places we sing about is a high priority for us.

Band members and band influence please?

Marek Vermin: guitar, lead vocals
Jenny from le bloc: lead vocals
Jimmy James: guitar
Ian “the Baker” Maki: bass
Casey: Drums

MV: We’re influenced by a wide variety of music. I’ve been into a wide range of stuff, everything from Arabic pop and folk music to Aus Rotten and Thin Lizzy, and I think a lot of that influences the songs I write. If I could write like anyone, though, I would choose to be able to write songs like Bruce Springsteen or Phil Lynott. Ideologically, I think I’m most influenced by anarchist thinkers like Kropotkin, Bakunin, Goldman, Bookchin, Malatesta, and so forth, and philosophically I have been inspired by the likes of Foucault, Derrida, Hegel, Zizek, Lacan, Schelling, and information theory. You’ll find this stuff scattered all over the lyrics I write, but I try to make the words accessible. I know that these ideas are complex, but they shouldn’t be alienating. At the same time, the world we live in is complex and a lot of bad ideas come to the fore because we think we can simplify the world. I think that this is partially why religion and conspiracy theories are so attractive, because they offer simple solutions for why things are the way they are. They create these grand narratives that pretend to explain everything. Once you believe in it, everything you encounter can be explained in terms of that idea. I know people are smarter than that, but I think that emotionally it is more appealing to have a simple ‘truth’, even if you know better. I try to use the music as a vehicle to explain that there is always a wider narrative than what you might otherwise think.

Casey Lewis (CL): Well, when the Martyr Index started out, musically, it was a little more eclectic, and also a little more punk rock. I would say that early TMI stuff took a bit of a cue from bands like the Clash and Stiff Little Fingers, incorporating a sort of “roots punk” vibe, bringing in all sorts of different musics from around the world. There was a bit of reggae, a bit of ska, a bit of African jazz, a LOT of folk music, like Guthrie and Dylan, and then of course, a great deal of Punk Rock. Over time, we started to incorporate more of a straight-ahead rock n’ roll thing, a lot of what we like to call “butt rock”, stuff like AC/DC, Thin Lizzy, etc. A lot of ’70’s hard rock. A lot of the “world music” stuff got phased out in favour of straight-up boogie down rock n’ roll, and I, for one, am ok with that…:)

Jenny From Le Bloc (JFLB): I’m mostly influenced by male singers, I think because I have such a deep and manly voice. If I ever got compared to Jack Black, I would probably die of happiness. I also really love Ronnie James Dio, Josh Homme, Bruce Springsteen, Brody Dalle…. I’m drawn to singers that are powerful and raw, but also technically accomplished. On the other hand, I also really love Aretha Franklin, Ella Fitzgerald, that Motown-y soul scene… so incorporating elements of those influences into my role in The Martyr Index has been a really cool experiment.

How is the local punk/hardcore scene there in canada?

MV: It is hard to say. Canada is a huge place, really. It is hard to wrap your head around what’s going on in a place where you can drive for 14 hours and not encounter a town. In a place like this there isn’t so much a scene as a bunch of scenes. Overall, though, I think that the affluence of Western Canada has produced a type of hardcore that is more about an aesthetic than substance. Most of these kids aren’t yelling because they have something to yell about, they are yelling because of how it sounds. Maybe they’re angry for real, but it is hard to feel sympathy for anger felt by people who don’t really struggle. There’s still substance and real anger in a lot of punk from here, but it isn’t the majority. Most of the hardcore we see is fashion-based and it isn’t that interesting to me. Not that I think you can’t have a fashion band, and indeed fashion is a huge part of identifying as a punk, but when I listen to fashion rock, I want it to be pretty exotic and entertaining. I used to sing in bands that were really angry all of the time, but it didn’t feel right, because I’m not an angry person in general.

Why did you choose Martyr Index as your band name?

MV: Casey came up with it. I liked it because I’ve always been interested in the notion of an ideal that people would die for. That kind of powerful belief says something. I don’t think it is necessarily the healthiest expression of belief, but I do think that martyrdom serves to make people into an inspiration for others who struggle. We’ve caught a little bit of flak for it because of the phenomenon of suicide bombers, but that wasn’t the original notion for us. We were thinking of people like Buenaventura Durruti, the Haymarket Martyrs, and Fred Hampton.

CL: Have we caught flak for that? That’s dumb….I think you have to remember that most of humanity’s real heroes, for thousands of years, have been martyrs, both good and bad. The reason I chose the name (besides the fact that I think it sounds cool) is that Martyrdom is the ultimate expression of commitment to an ideal, again, both good and bad. Christ was a martyr, but there are people out there who consider Hitler to be a martyr, too. I think that the inherent divisiveness over what constitutes a martyr is what makes the concept interesting. Some martyrs are willing, others are not. I suppose the name is an homage to what people live and die for.

What can you say about the current socio-political events in your country?

MV: Currently Canada is in a strange situation. Right now we have a neoconservative government, very ideologically in tune with the Bush administration, in power. However, they are a minority government with no other right-wing parties in government, so they need to appeal to the centre for authorization on anything they try to pass. I like the fact that even though the Harper government is a psychotic, neoconservative party, it has to make appeals to others and negotiate to move ahead with anything.

That said, I think that the whole of North America is in a dangerous trajectory, mostly due to repercussions from US foreign policy and how closely interwoven our economies and politics are with the US. It is impossible to separate Canada from the US. We share a massive border and most of our trade flows North and South. California is much closer to us here in Western Canada than Quebec is, so that has served to integrate our economies and politics. As a result, when the US went crazy after 9/11, Canada followed suit, enacting a bunch of crazy legislation that stripped citizens of protections from the government. Canada stopped short of a lot of the more draconian shit that became policy in the US, but we were heavily affected by it nonetheless. Now there is momentum to move beyond the “free trade” agreements that exist between Canada, the US, and Mexico (NAFTA) and create a common political entity, much like the EU, based around “security.” The whole security issue is a fraud though. It is a push for American manifest destiny. No agreement drafted with the US ever benefits the other country, it is always to the benefit of US interests, mostly corporate. So, as the US becomes a more hierarchical country and people are scared into handing over their rights without a fight, it is sucking Canada along with it. Further, once the US economy collapses, Canada will be sucked into their bullshit, because of the integration of economies and politics. As a result, I am of the mindset that US politics are not just for Americans, they are of vital importance to Canadians. The same holds true everywhere else, especially Iraq. I’m sure that the same can be said of the Philippines. The US is the pre-eminent empire in the world and as a result, every other country is attached to them in one way or another. It just so happens that Canada is attached to the US with an imaginary line we call a border.

There are a lot of anarcho peace punk groups here in our country, what is your message to them?

MV: Stay strong and keep working. Build your culture, because it will be the most valuable thing in the world one day. The world is being over-run by people without any belief in the shared humanity of our species and we need people who are rational and sane to build effective infrastructure to counter that.

CL: I agree with Mark on that…it can be easy to feel disheartened and disenfranchised with the apparent lack of change and progress in the world around you, but even a small contribution can help to turn the tide. Even just writing a song or a poem, writing a zine, talking to people, raising your kids to think for themselves….all of those things help. Remember that if you won’t do it, who will?

Do you believe in revolution?

MV: Yes. I think that it would be absurd not to. I think, however, that we need to reconsider the notion of revolution, because I don’t believe in a grand revolution that overturns everything and fixes all our problems. I think there are two types of revolution and they are both necessary, but they are very different in character. The first one is a slow, organic process that leads to enormous changes in the way we interact and see the world. The other is more immediate, with people rising up and overthrowing a system that has been repressing change. The two are obviously tied together, but I don’t think that they are inclusive. The first form, the uber-revolution, is one that would probably require numerous smaller revolutions taking place within its spheres of influence. For example, the move away from feudal systems throughout Europe was marked not only by numerous revolts, but also millions of other efforts to creatively undermine, re-make, and change the system in power. It wasn’t a simple matter of building for a single moment of revolution and casting off the shackles of the old system, even though that’s how the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks imagined their efforts. The truth was that the system had to be undermined systemically, with the way people envision their role in society completely changed.

The structure of power isn’t just hierarchical, it is something that is sustained throughout all of society. That’s why changing the structure of the state or the economy without changing the discourses throughout a society never seems to produce a lasting revolution. It is also why revolutionaries who believe in a Jacobin-style revolution mistake that when a revolution does occur, that it was their efforts alone that brought about the revolution, that they are the legitimate vanguards of the revolution. That’s what happened in the Cuban revolution. Castro and Guevara believed that the revolution was brought about with them leading the charge, but the truth is that the revolution was a long process which included the input of people who had participated in the Spanish Revolution of 1936-1939. So when Che Guevara failed at every other revolutionary endeavour he partook in, he was surprised. You can see the despair in his Bolivian journal. The reason why the Cuban revolution was possible had little to do with the small band of guerillas in the mountains and more to do with the preparedness of Cuban society in general. The guerillas just represented an outburst of nationalist and socialist sentiment that provided enough of a catalyst to overthrow the Batista government. So what we call the Cuban revolution is actually just a moment of a more important revolutionary force. In fact, I think that to a certain extent, the misreading of the Cuban revolution has led to forces of repression that have generally worked to arrest the progress of the revolution. The US blockade has done the most damage, but the Cuban regime has repressed the arts and freedom of expression, as well as homosexuality, which in the long run may leave Cuba with little meaningful cultural change. It might become easy to cast off socialism if there’s no grassroots cultural maintenance of the ideals.

So there’s a more meaningful type of revolution that I do think has the potential to remake the order of the world, but the revolutionaries of the moment can’t be trusted to work towards that. Once someone seizes power, they will usually move to secure their power and ossify the revolution. In the log run, it just means that revolutionary progress requires numerous progressions, including overthrowing governments, but we should remain sceptical about what we fight for. We need to keep in mind the words of the Who: “Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.”

CL: I believe that all existence is defined by cycles. The very word “revolution” is in direct reference to this. So yes, I believe in revolution. But more than revolution, I believe in the power of true CHANGE. The problem with “revolution” as a concept is that humanity has a tendency to repeat the same mistakes when the wheel comes ’round again. We have to learn to pay more than just lip service to the mistakes of the past. We need to learn, so that when revolution DOES happen, we’re prepared to clean the mud off the wheel, if you’ll forgive the ham-handed metaphor. And that is where I believe change comes into the picture. Remember, a revolving door goes through revolutions, but doesn’t go anywhere at all….

If you have one song to dedicate to all human race what would it be? why this song?

MV: Ha ha. How about “Won’t Get Fooled Again” by the Who? We could cover that. I don’t think any of my songs are good enough to dedicate to the whole human race, but I’m hoping to write a song like that some day. If I do, I’ll let you know.

CL: Um, that’s a good question. I would say “Freewill” by Rush. That answer will be soundly rejected by the entire band, though, because they hate Rush, haha.

JFLB: Probably “Can’t Stop” by the Chili Peppers. I want that shit played at my funeral, yo.

I’ve decided to reach out to all of the members of our local punk/hardcore community( TARLAC ) by creating this DIY zine made out of paper and some materials, since our town is a poor town and not most of us have access in the internet which would mean they can’t discover or dig such great bands like yours, what would be your message to all members of the philippine punk/hardcore community?

MV: I don’t know if I have a message for the community there. I think maybe we need to learn from you. You guys are so inspiring. The energy and the passion that the kids have in the Philippines is inspiring. I hope that some day people here can get to see some of your bands and share part of your scene. I also hope that we can play there to meet the people we’ve been in contact with over the years and to see your infoshops and projects in real life. If the Philippines has a chance to destroy its brutal class system and foreign domination of the economy, I believe that the people who are part of the punk rock community will be a part of that.

CL: Before we started corresponding with people in the Philippines, I had no idea how dedicated the independent music and politics community was there. I guess I had never really thought about it, because here in Canada we have the luxury of taking our music and our culture for granted. It makes me feel a little ashamed to think of how much resistance and persecution the young punks have to face elsewhere in the world when it comes to expressing themselves and trying to fight for change. Places like the Philippines, and Burma, and Israel, and Iraq….I’m with Mark, I admire the amount of commitment you guys have to those ideals of free expression, socio-economic responsibility, and revolutionary attitudes. Much respect.

JFLB: I’ve got to agree with Marek and Casey on this one. We are so privileged in North America in terms of our resources for communication and change that I think we often forget how lucky we are and don’t take advantage of them. So to communicate with people who are working together with such dedication is so inspirational. It’s an important reminder that change is possible, in large part because of the dedication of people like you – putting this zine out, informing the community you live in, and staying strong and hopeful.

Any last words?

MV: Keep on struggling!

CL: Amen to that.

Conservative ‘punks’, on the other hand, are system backers. Like the namesake suggests, conservatives are people who don’t like social agitation in a direction that departs from the previous (or current) system. Conservativism always changes though. One generation of Conservatives wants to preserve the monarchies while the next wants to preserve the liberal free market. The general defining element is a massive fear of any form of social, political or economic progress or experimentation. Conservatives who call themselves punks are no different: they are afraid of real systemic change and any form of radicalism. As a result, they represent the opposite of a spirit of rebellion. They represent the status quo. Punk conservatives might think they are rebelling against what they see as ‘mindless’ rebellion, but rebelling against rebellion just makes you a counter-rebel, not a rebel of your own right. It is always much easier to believe in the system that already exists and that there is not an alternative. The act of rebelling against those who would endeavour to challenge the system is merely an act of social entrenchment. Someone can go to any subculture and meaninglessly rebel against its cultural norms. I can get into hip-hop because I like Grandmaster Flash and then start rebelling against it’s rebellious components, but by doing so, all I’m doing it countering it’s most meaningful components and making it another meaningless aesthetic – a fashion.

So, if the substance of punk is really rebellion, then conservativism and punk are antithetical to each other. The whole suggestion that someone can back the status-quo and still be punk, is essentially this: punk has no substance whatsoever. If you can be conservative and punk, then punk isn’t about rebellion. It’s just a fashion statement; a neat tattoo and three chords.

Dave Smalley, while no doubt meaning well, suggests that punk rock is about “seeing the problems in the world and fighting… to make it better.” This is not the case. Everyone does that. Fighting for what you believe isn’t something that is unique to punk and punk could never provide an outlet for political transformation because it is just a subculture. A totally punk revolution (of any stripe) would be the worst kind ever, because it would be so narrow in scope that it couldn’t account for the rest of humanity that was culturally isolated from it.

Dave Smalley then continues on some inane rant about how we need to avoid one world government and suggests that the US is being bullied by the UN (yeah, like how the UN stopped the US from invading Iraq and how the UN forced the US to abolish the death penalty and how the UN forced the US to stop providing arms to Israel and how the UN stopped the US invasion of Panama and how the UN stopped the US from arming terror squads in Nicaragua, etc. Wow. That one world government sure is so powerful to be pushing around the poor little United States like that). First off, what Mr. Smalley doesn’t realize is that he’s spent so much time around republicans that he forgot that punk rock is most closely associated with the ideology of anarchism and that anarchists aren’t in support of one-world government either. However, anarchists also don’t tend to think that the US government is being bullied NOR is it benevolent in its actions. Even punks that aren’t anarchists, if they still hold true to the spirit of rebellion that spawned their subculture, still question the system they grew up in (or came to live in). It wasn’t just the anarcho-punks who thought Reagan and Thatcher were dipshits.

Cultural rebellion requires that it is always suspicious of authority. Otherwise it is meaningless. If conservativism can be punk, then punk is truly dead. But I don’t believe that. I think, instead, that the punks calling themselves conservatives are just another group of rockers with more in common with the Partridge Family and the Charlie Daniels Band than the Sex Pistols or the MC5. They’ve either lost the spirit of punk rock (or rock, even) or never had it in the first place. Sure, they might have grown up on, or at least been inspired by the music and culture of punk, but that doesn’t mean anything. Mozart was incredibly reviled by conservatives in his time and now he’s beloved by all sorts of conservatives. Times have changed and the things that made punk a threat at one point no longer make it a threat anymore. Tattoos just aren’t socially dangerous anymore. Neither is a mohawk. And it certainly isn’t the music. The music is completely palatable and even the Dead Kennedys were approached by Levis Jeans to use “Holiday in Cambodia” for a pants commercial (for pants that might actually have been made in a third-world sweatshop). No, the aesthetic of punk rock is very non-threatening in today’s day and age. The same thing happened to punk that happened to all of the genres of rebellious music before it – it become culturally appropriate and non-threatening. And so in come the conservatives, yesterday’s sell-outs, to claim it back.

But punk was only defined as a type of fashion in mainstream revues. It was more than just the bands and bondage pants, it was about scrutinizing your own society and throwing its garbage back at it. It has always been about saying ‘fuck you’ to the man, regardless of how you defined ‘the man.’

What is important isn’t how one can fit their aesthetic into their beliefs, but whether or not one can carry the spirit of the culture with them as it changes. I see the spirit of rebellion everywhere I look. Kids are still suspicious of authority. They are still treated like criminals by adults and reacting against it by embracing their frustration and turning it into creative and destructive acts of rebellion. Punk rock still has meaning. Geezers like Dave Smalley or me might attempt to cling to our punk roots with all our might, just so we don’t lose our identity, but unless we can carry that spirit of rebellion in our actions and words, we aren’t really punk anymore – we’re just a bunch of washed-up has-beens.

So to all of the punks out there: keep rocking hard and questioning everything. Some day you may find you don’t want to be a part of the spirit of punk anymore and you might want to join the Republican or Democratic Party (or Liberal and Conservative Party here in Canada). At that point, do the rest of us a favour and stop pretending you’re punk. Meanwhile, to everyone else who has the time and energy to kick at the door, even if you don’t know why, keep making punk a threat! Fuck the aesthetic! Keep punk rock alive by fueling it with your frustration and keep it running on rebellion!

“To the psychologists first of all, presuming they would like to study ressentiment close up for once, I would say: this plant blooms best today among anarchists and anti-Semites – where it has always bloomed, in hidden places, like the violet, though with a different odor. And as like must always produce like, it causes us no surprise to see a repetition in such circles of attempts made before… to sanctify revenge[1] under the name of justice[2] – as if justice were at the bottom merely a further development of the feeling being aggrieved-and to rehabilitate not only revenge but all reactive affects in general.”[3] – Friedrich Nietzsche.

“…sociality, and its necessary accompaniment – mutual aid, characteristic of the vast majority of animal species and so much more of man, – were the source of moral sentiments from the time of the very first appearance of man-like creatures on earth, and that social sentiments were further strengthened by the realization and understanding of the facts of social life, i.e., by the effort of reason. And in proportion to the development and increasing complexity of social life, reason acquired ever greater influence upon the moral make-up of man… And this moral feeling might have withered altogether if the very nature of man, as well as of the majority of the more highly developed animals, did not involve, aside from the herd instinct, a certain mental bent which supports and strengthens the influence of sociality.”[4] – Peter Kropotkin.

Nothing To Do With Anything

The a priori in the question of from whence morality emerges is a recurring conflict in western philosophy, which must either draw its a priori from transcendental analysis, from contemporaneous phenomenal evidence and hence, a posteriori proofs, or from some dialectical synthesis of the two. Simply stated, the origins of morality either have to be derived from some form of logically or emotionally rooted mythology, from evidence we can witness, or from a combination of both.

However, the problem with even so-called objective scientific approaches, especially in sciences concerned with such obviously subjective (but not necessarily essentially Subjective) and consequence-bearing matter as human ethics, is that these sciences are still tainted with a form of mythos and ideological fantasy. In Slavoj Žižek we find an interpretation of Lacan that helps to elucidate how ideology produces an effect of transference, which basically forces a closing of logic upon signifiers of the subject at hand. Žižek asserts that “transference is the obverse of the staying behind of the signified with respect to the stream of the signifiers; it consists of the illusion that the meaning of a certain element (which was retroactively fixed by the intervention of the master-signifier) was present in it from the very beginning as its immanent essence.”[5] In other words, if Lacan’s thesis is to be accepted, the whole notion that ideological perspectives are concluded from proofs is fallacious and, ‘in fact,’ quite the opposite is true: ideology (the big Other) determines the meaning of its own proofs, retroactively fixing their contextual network of relations within an ideological “quilt.” This is referred to as the ‘effect of retroversion’, where “instead of the linear, immanent, necessary progression according to which meaning unfolds itself from some initial kernel, we have a radically contingent process of retroactive production of meaning.”[6]

But this thesis does not insist that there is no objective “real”; that we are entangled in a hyperbolized post-modern web of absolute intersubjectivity – i.e. the truth is a convenient myth. Indeed, Žižek is acutely aware of this inclination when he asks “…have we not consented also to the usual ‘post-modernist’ anti-Enlightenment ressentiment?”[7] But such is not the case. Instead, what Žižek’s thought produces is a scenario where objectivity (the truth) is not fully constituted in our mind, obscured by a number of psychological processes that are necessary for us to perceive a rational order of our own making. Ernesto Laclau articulates Žižek’s position as such:

There is subject because the substance – objectivity – does not manage to constitute itself fully; the location of the subject is that of a fissure at the very centre of the structure. The traditional debate as to the relationship between agent and structure thus appears fundamentally displaced: the issue is no longer a problem of autonomy, of determinism versus free will, in which two entities fully constituted as ‘objectivities’ mutually limit each other. On the contrary, the subject emerges as a result of the failure of substance in the process of its self-constitution. …Indeed, deconstruction reveals that it is the ‘undecidables’ which form the ground on which any structure is based. …the subject is merely the distance between the undecidable structure and the decision. And analysis of the exact dimensions of any decision reached on undecidable terrain is the central task of the theory of politics, a theory which has to show the contingent ‘origins’ of all objectivity.[8]

This is a paradox exhibited in the television program the X Files. The program boldly proclaims that “the truth is out there,” yet the two main characters, the agents Mulder and Scully, are incapable of uncovering it. Even though they are slowly uncovering facts and peeling away layers of conspiracy which obfuscate the truth, they are still bound by their separate ideological theses, each one proving to the other that they were “wrong.” In the end, whether there are alien life forms or not, is irrelevant, because the kernel of the true is manifested in the fact that there is a conspiracy in their government, regardless of what it is hiding. In the lack of the other can be found the element of the objective truth.

And the philosophy of morals is something inherently political, because it reinforces political structures – the manner in which we order our social efforts – and informs our ideological assumptions while concurrently being articulated through our interactions, which are also informed by our ideological assumptions. This politico-ethical feedback-loop is the reason that a science of morality is so difficult to articulate and why the discovery/manufacture of some a priori ‘truth’ is needed to prop up any given position. It is also the reason why the claim to ‘objectivity’ is so wrought with peril and can carry extreme consequences.

Out current ideological prejudices carry us in such a manner that there is an assumed hard line, a contradistinction, drawn between Enlightenment thought and ‘post-modernism.’ But like any categorization that assists in simplifying the world for our senses and need for rational expediency, it is based upon generalizations that do not apply to the whole breadth of the category – i.e. there are metaphorical trans-genders dispersed throughout the genders. Following the Marxian Hegel-derived formula that the limit of capital is capitalism itself – i.e. that is folds in upon its own contradictions, producing another synthesis – Žižek suggests that “according to Lacan the limit of Enlightenment is Enlightenment itself…”[9] In other words, in a perfectly Hegelian sense, the current epoch of ‘post-modernism’ even contains within itself, in its variance, the remnants of the Enlightenment; it is appropriately titled a “post” something-or-other, because without the various philosophical engagements of the Enlightenment, post-modernism would not exist as such. We are indebted to those ‘dead white men’ who came before us and a blanket disregard for their works is without a doubt a type of ressentiment.

There is no hard line existing between the thought of the Enlightenment and contemporary thought that would allow us to pin the ills of the past solely upon the sweeping generalizations we might make of the Enlightenment. Our philosophical bumbling is exemplified by infinite possibility, not to be corrected any time in the near future, and although we do synthesize dialectically toward greater knowledge[10] and hopefully,[11] in a direction that leads toward the objective truth (even though we are quite likely to never perceive it due to the limited nature of our subject-oriented process of perceiving and conceiving), it is an exercise in pomp to deride the past; an exercise that indicates a decisive lack in the Other of certain contemporary philosophical perspectives. In his work on Kropotkin, Brian Morris illustrates this problematic assumption:

Although Enlightenment thought had a certain coherence – reflected in the writings of Diderot, Voltaire, Hume, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Bentham, Kant, and Herder – it was by no means monolithic and was in fact complex and ridden with inner tensions and ambiguities. The identification of the enlightenment with a blind faith in progress or with a naive rationalism is facile in extreme. Equally problematic is the tendency of postmodernist scholars to blame the ills of the twentieth century on the Enlightenment philosophers – ignoring completely the realities of capitalism and fascist ideology.[12]

And this ressentiment active in contemporary thought, which feels the need to pretend it is not at least partially a product of the Enlightenment’s contradictions, leads us right back to Nietzsche, the great devil’s advocate of morality, who is witnessing an incredible resurgence in popularity, quite possibly partly as a result of this very ressentiment; ironic.

The Philosophical Tantrum

Nietzsche’s moral critique rests to a great extent upon the two major characteristics: the reactionary slave morality expressed in ressentiment, and the a priori economic determinism[13] that is the progenitor of morality. But before considering these notions, it is important to gain some perspective on the context of Nietzsche’s work.

From Nietzsche’s perspective, Europe was a sick place which had contracted a moralistic virus through a form of superstitious ideology, producing a form of animal that loathed its very nature. Undeniably, European Christianity had produced a moral hegemony that maintained an overwhelming distaste for many natural human impulses, drives and behaviours. This distaste was (and quite obviously remains to this day) so exaggerated and brutal that it produced a repressive gulf between the nature of humanity and ‘proper’ morality, so that they should become almost completely mutually exclusive behaviours. Nietzsche noted that the degree to which the “morbid softening and moralization through which the animal “man” finally learns to be ashamed of his instincts…”[14] could be seen around him, exhibited in exquisite detail in the way that “Pope Innocent the Third, disapprovingly catalogues his own repellant aspects (“impure begetting, disgusting means of nutrition in his mother’s womb, bareness of matter out of which man evolves, hideous stink, secretion of saliva, urine, and filth”).”[15] In other words, Nietzsche’s world was a hotbed of repression of instinct and desire, where the intellectual “man” derided the animal “man” and transformed the latter into a caged beast, maltreated and malnourished.

Additionally, psychological science was just barely emerging at the time that Genealogy of Morals (1887) was first published (Nietzsche actually anticipates Freud on a number of occasions, especially when he talks about repression), and Charles Darwin had only 16 years earlier published the Descent of Man (1871), a book which had the potential power to completely undermine the anthropocentric basis of European philosophical discourses. Strikingly, although Nietzsche’s discourse is primarily concerned with the nature of the human as an animal and the repression of such through reason, he makes only one passing allusion to Darwin in the Preface of Genealogy of Morals and completely dismisses him outright as a “mediocre” collector of “small and common facts” in Beyond Good and Evil.[16] Darwin’s other great philosophical offence was of course being English; of belonging to the people that Nietzsche linked with a “profound normality”; England being the home of “European vulgarity, the plebeianism of modern ideas…” – “They are no philosophical race, these Englishmen…”[17] For all his love of the individual, Nietzsche is quick to sacrifice all to the general – the nation.

Hilarity aside, Nietzsche suggests that in order to create a grand newness, one cannot simply be one who is skillful at assembling small facts and drawing conclusions (like Darwin) but may actually have to be lacking in knowledge. This reflects the notion that perhaps on some level knowledge and consciousness need to be destroyed before something grand can be awakened; that creativity requires a certain naivety. Of course, in Nietzsche’s moral speculations, he simply commits the error, not only of failing to remember that all philosophy and science is simply the articulation of how infinitely little we actually do know, but also of supposing that by deducing theories through transcendental methods, he is actually doing something other than assembling “data” a posteriori. For Nietzsche can have similar charges directed back at him – In assembling a theory of morality utilizing semiotic evidence, Greek literature, and armed with an entire canon of philosophical texts, Nietzsche is simply “determining and collecting many small and common facts and then drawing conclusions from them…”[18]

Nietzsche’s dismissal of Darwin, however, is necessary, for it allows him to proceed in Beyond Good and Evil and Genealogy of Morals in stating something grand and provocative, without being tied down in the dry, passionless, arid discourse that accompanied the British Royal Society scholars of the time. And in the name of all grand incendiary statements, like a Johnny Rotten, a Peaches or an Ice T, Nietzsche says something provocative and profound, that inspires and infuriates, forcing a reaction. I don’t think I am out of line, either, when I compare Nietzsche to Ice T, because when Ice T declares “fuck the police” in Cop Killer, even if Nietzsche would claim that it originates from a slavish ressentiment, he nevertheless inverts morality and forces a social reaction amongst his peers. Precisely, this is the initial lure of such a spirit as Nietzsche – that he is unapologetically confrontational and damned be his detractors. All that is required is that philosophy is richer with his tantrum. And a fine tantrum Nietzsche provided, casting aside all of moral assumptions, as it were, because they needed to be cast aside.

Nietzsche, Ressentiment and Anarchist Dogs – Woof Woof

Nietzsche begins his assault on European morality by introducing his concept of ressentiment, in which the natural norms of “good”, rooted in the self-affirmation of the nobility (i.e. masters), are inverted by jealous and vengeful slaves. In nobility, the master is self-referential, but the slave is quite the opposite: “in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is fundamental reaction.”[19] In what Nietzsche considers a virtual act of genius, it was the Jews, persecuted and enslaved, who first (at least consequently) inverted the aristocratic value-equation and initiated what he calls ‘the slave revolt in morality.’[20] Unlike the Spartacus slave revolt, which entered into direct martial confrontation with the Roman state and in which the slaves’ demands were material, the Jewish slave revolt was more insidious because was based on a total social revaluation grown out of helplessness and weakness. Thus weakness was transfigured as a type of “good”, and strength became “bad.” In addition, a type of jealous hatred was fostered for those not belonging to the ranks of the helpless, who in reality coveted the position of domination; a ressentiment borne out of the desire for revenge.

Amongst contemporary Nietzschean anarchists the notion of ressentiment has come to play a crucial role in analytical discourse, despite the fact that Nietzsche considered anarchism to be the symptom par excellence of this vengeful slave morality. According to Saul Newman, “anarchism could become more relevant to contemporary political struggles if it were made aware of the ressentiment logic of its own discourse, particularly in the essentialist identities and structures that inhabit it.”[21] In this sense, Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment can become a form of corrective to the conventions of Manichean dualism that Newman finds to be embedded in anarchism. He sees a pattern of oppositional discourse permeating anarchist thought that essentially posits power against nature. This discourse, in which anarchism “operates within a Manichean political logic: it creates an essential, moral opposition between society and the State, between humanity and power.”[22] Citing Foucault’s notion of power as a relation of forces[23] (which, by the way, can be found in Hegel to a certain extent), rather than as embedded in a subject or object, Newman points out that the fetishistic emphasis on the nature of the state as opposing the nature of society is proven weak. This is especially apparent in light of contemporary perspectives that acknowledge the existence of interweaving webs of power.

The Nietzschean anarchist (or post-anarchist according to Newman) reception of Foucault’s theses is that the classical anarchist denial of the power principle produces an absolute weakness in its philosophy whereby the more it attempts “to free society from relations of power, the more it remains paradoxically caught up in power.”[24] Undoubtedly, this understanding of power-relations leads to an abolition of the grand, final orgasm concept that has dominated radical European thinking, and indeed enamoured Bakunin, Kropotkin and Marx alike, since the French revolution. In its place is the millions of orgasms concept of Foucault (both the Foucauldian post-structuralist Socialists and the Lacanian Marxists like Žižek agree on to some small extent on the nature of contemporary revolutionary strategy), which takes on positions of domination one climax at a time, provoking and prodding, in order to reduce the hold of domination on power at a more organic level.[25]

However, the most interesting proposition put forth by Newman is that Nietzsche was opposed to ‘reactive power’ – that is, power that requires an external object to stand opposed to – and not ‘active power,’ which finds its substance in the individual’s instinctive discharge of will. Newman suggests that perhaps communal relations based upon an “openness to difference and self-transformation, and the ethic of care, may be the defining characteristics of the post-anarchist democratic community. This would be a community of active power – a community of ‘masters’ rather than ‘slaves.’”[26] Of course, an active community of ‘masters’ is an impossibility, since a master is defined as a matter of course by the presence and their dependence upon a servant, but Saul Newman’s point is that perhaps Nietzsche’s ‘ethical’ category of the master, who does not define their values through a hostile external, and instead develops its morality “from a triumphant affirmation of itself…”[27] is possible to manifest itself as the ethos for a future society.

This theory is well and good, but it seems a far cry from Nietzschean conceptions of what values of strength are – “a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity.”[28] Undeniably, these were the values of the knightly-aristocratic class that Nietzsche celebrates historically, but he is not calling them into being again. He is no primitivist. He elucidates that the emergence of the ressentiment of the priestly spirit was a necessary intervention in an all-too-comfortable simplicity of the knightly-aristocratic class and its value system. But nonetheless, Nietzsche’s resurgence of the supermen, free of ressentiment must be of spirits “strengthened by war and victory, for whom conquest, adventure, danger, and even pain have become needs… it would require even a sublime kind of wickedness, an ultimate, supremely self-confident mischievousness in knowledge that goes with great health; it would require, in brief and alas, precisely this great health!”[29] If Newman is rejecting the notion of cataclysmic revolt in anarchism, it is a mystery from whence this war-strengthened spirit may be obtained; maybe video games that reminisce past days of glory when men could kill each other for some mythological quest (like protecting the free world from a dictator in Iraq, who is out to destroy freedom with weapons of mass destruction! What was his name again? Cobra Commander?)?

This says nothing even of the cruelty that plays such a significant role in Nietzsche’s celebrated animal, a trap which Newman skillfully evades, since his essay does not even approach this subject. In fact, Newman, unlike Nietzsche, insinuates that all efforts to delineate a sort of collectivity in human nature and even human nature itself are essentialist and therefore inaccurate. Hence, one might even be able to develop a collective impulse “without circumscribing it in essentialist ideas about human nature. Collective action does not need a principle of human essence to justify it.”[30] But if nature cannot be articulated in humanity, then there is actually no animal as such to speak of, and Nietzsche’s whole polemic loses it’s a priori to fall flat on a false premise (which it is, but not particularly this one. We’ll get back to that in a moment). We can just as easily assert that the only reason we don’t see five ton pigs wandering around is because there is just not any pig that has willed it as of yet. The truth of the matter is that there is such a thing as instinct in humanity and there is such a thing as nature; it gives us character as beasts, and one of Nietzsche’s most powerful contributions to moral philosophy stems from this naturalistic assertion and the recognition of natures in humanity that caused a type of self-loathing and sickness when repressed. If essentialism means that one believes that humans can’t transcend the laws of nature and fly naked in outer space, while growing additional functional limbs simply by willing it, then colour me essentialist, since it is just a lackadaisical attitude towards differentiating between the recognition of the possibility of universals and a total dismissal of all universals that makes for shitty post-modernism.[31]

Additionally, the nature of collective action does not need to be justified by human nature. It can indeed be the rational progression from singularity to collectivity, developed for its own ethical purposes, as Newman suggests. But his formula is backwards. If human nature is antithetical to collectivity, then forcing humans to engage in collectivities is a form of repression of the human instinct, and therefore, it is important to know just to what degree humans are social and collective, as well as individualistic creatures. It is also important to reflect upon primary human instincts, if indeed homo-sapiens are actually phenomenally bound to the universe and not just pure transcendent thought (who knows, maybe we are the butterfly dreaming of Zhuangzi).

Newman also falls into the trap of associating Enlightenment thought, and even contemporary anarchist discourse, with a cartoonish simplicity, and in the process manages to obfuscate the real complexity of character of 19th century anarchist philosophy, and most significantly, I would say, the ideas of Peter Kropotkin. He unfortunately associates Kropotkin with the dualistic and essentialist notions that he is dismissing as Manichean, which betrays a complete misreading, or at least a hyper-generalization of Kropotkin’s works.

Kropotkin: hata or playa?

Kropotkin, although firmly rooted in the Enlightenment tradition – he was a staunch materialist, a believer in the French Revolution, and an advocate of eternal progress – was nonetheless also a highly critical thinker, wary of easy dualistic answers and, like Nietzsche, was incredibly critical of not only Romantic thought, but Enlightenment philosophy as well (although Kropotkin is the sunshine and lollypop to Nietzsche’s fire and brimstone). Indeed, Kropotkin, a well-traveled naturalist and anthropological observer, recognized in Darwin’s work the kernel for a potential disentanglement of anthropocentrism that had perverted European philosophic outlooks. According to Morris, what Darwin had done with his advancement of evolutionary theory was nothing less than a total undermining of the “belief in cosmic teleology, the idea that nature has a final goal or purpose.”[32] In fact, Morris asserts that “Darwin thus completely undermined, long before Heidegger and post-structuralists came upon the scene, the philosophy of essentialism, which, stemming from Plato, is deeply entrenched in the Western philosophical tradition as well as being anchored in ordinary language.”[33] Kropotkin himself admitted the endless scope of adaptability and its impact on human sciences, stating that “ethical science is not yet constituted. In fact, it never will be, because new factors and new tendencies will always have to be taken into account as mankind advances in evolution.”[34] Kropotkin built this theoretical model of morality to a great extent on Darwin’s evolutionary thought, and especially on a corrective he himself developed most thoroughly to the Darwinian emphasis on competition – the notion of mutual aid. Additionally, this notion also illuminated the concept of life as a continuum, rather than as encased in separate entities. Life is not static, it is in continuous flux and as a result what constitutes the nature and composition of a life-form today may not even exist in a million years, having either undergone extensive change or passed into extinction. Kropotkin did not see humans as an end result, nor did he see us as a fixed element outside of nature. Rather, he understood that we are a relatively similar cluster of fluidly adapting biological organisms on a continuum of life, differentiable from other life forms in the path which our evolution has taken. The recently acquired knowledge of DNA sequences tends to confirm this postulation.[35]

In Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution Kropotkin establishes the notion of sociability as being a major component of the evolutionary process. Not only is it a marker of ever-increasing complexity (bubblegum for entropy addicts), but it is also a self-developing phenomenon that allows for species to endure and adapt more efficiently to environmental changes. It is also in this observation of sociability amongst species that Kropotkin noticed an emergence of moral structures. This was an elaboration of a process that Darwin himself had noted in the Descent of Man, but had allowed to fall to the wayside, largely unnoticed. Kropotkin does acknowledge that warfare plays a vital role in nature, but that it is to a great extent emphasized only between species where warfare and struggle against takes place. Within species, mutual support tends to be the rule (although, again, it must be made clear that Kropotkin did acknowledge the existence of murder and warfare within species, but it was far less common than not). By and large, he argues that sociability is a primary evolutionary feature and is the hallmark of the success of the various clan, hive and herd animal species.

In his final work, Ethics: Origin and Development, which Kropotkin considered to be a follow-up to Mutual Aid, Kropotkin not only undertakes an exhaustive study of the history of Western thought on Ethics (there is no doubt as to Kropotkin’s Eurocentrism), but he also outlines how he considers the nature of moral structures to emerge in human societies. Most important of his concepts, and it can’t be emphasized strongly enough, is that the emergence of morality in human society is a result of an evolutionary adaptive feature which predates the existence of humans, sociability. Sociability is a characteristic of the mutual aid phenomenon and is as instinctive to the species that possess and utilize it as any major bodily function. And it is the sociability that humanity inherited in its gene structure that allowed us to actually become a ‘successful’ species – to survive. A lack of development of such faculties, not only in humans, but also in most other animal species, would have led to an inability to adapt to hostile changes in the environment and quite likely, extinction.[36] With a general look at the numbers of solitary animals to herd and pack animals one can easily observe that the tiger-like and shark-like creatures are vastly outpopulated by the antelope-type, ant-type and wolf-type socialistically-based animals. Ants are particularly notable, because they are incredibly socially ordered, and they also constitute one of the most successful models of life on this planet, constituting at times as much as 15% of the total animal biomass of a tropical rainforest.[37] The largest biomass unit known on earth is the Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba), again a social creature, living “in large schools, called swarms, sometimes reaching densities of 10,000 – 30,000 individual animals per cubic meter.”[38] Antarctic krill, which weight only around 2 grams each, account for roughly 500 million tonnes of Earth’s biomass; contrast this to humans, weighing on average around 70,000 grams, and which we know to be littered almost everywhere across this planet, who only occupy about 250 million tonnes of biomass.[39] The point being, of course, that simple observation of the perceptible world attests to the evolutionary strength of mutual aid and sociability, and this has been largely understood amongst evolutionary theorists and anthropologists, despite the fact that Kropotkin has gone largely unacknowledged even in these fields.

From the sociability of the human species, Kropotkin contends that all human moral faculties are developed and that this development takes place in three major stages, all intrinsically associated. These stages are identified by Kropotkin as mutual aid, justice and morality proper, all of which are self-preservation instincts, and are “rooted in man’s mind with all the force of an inborn instinct – the first instinct, that of Mutual Aid, being evidently the strongest, while the third, developed later than the others, is an unstable feeling and the least imperative of the three.”[40] Unlike Nietzsche, who postulates that justice emerges in the form of an exchange between two approximately equal parties (all exchanges being a flow of forces), a coming to terms by means of a settlement of good will,[41] Kropotkin suggests that justice is instead an instinct towards social stabilization which recognizes a certain equality in similitude (i.e. the similitude of humans attests to their necessary equality). In both cases, equality is necessary for justice and Nietzsche’s recognition of this actually strengthens Kropotkin’s case. What is the reason for two parties to agree on their relative equity and to come to terms with one-another in good will if not for social stability?

However, even in dramatically hierarchically structured societies, where a general concept of justice is found to be relatively non-existent between classes, there are still highly structured notions of justice within the classes. What Nietzsche assumes, however, is that hierarchies are first established and then justice is needed to administer affairs and expedite the functioning of the master classes, who “compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves.”[42] Kropotkin’s thesis is quite divergent from Nietzsche’s, as it postulates that a recognition of equality, and therefore justice, is a primary instinct that emerges out of sociability and that the establishment of hierarchies, a combination of reason, the impulse to lead, and a will to power, is what produces the various social classes; classes are a social affect and justice, to Kropotkin synonymous at its core with the concept of equity, is instinctive (not rational).

Kropotkin notes that the vast majority of ethical theory, including Nietzsche’s I might add, in some way or other recognizes equity as the basis for justice, and justice as a cornerstone of morality, arguing that “no matter how often the principle of equity was violated in the history of mankind, no matter how assiduously legislators up to the present day have made every effort to circumvent it, and moral philosophers to pass over it in silence – nevertheless, the recognition of equity lies at the basis of all moral conceptions and even of all moral teachings.”[43]

From this perspective, we can see where Kropotkin’s vision of human nature diverges dramatically from that of Hobbes and Rousseau. Indeed, Kropotkin asserts that since sociality predated the existence of humanity, and that since humans are inherently social species, there has never been a time when humans where atomistic and asocial. From the very outset, even before the outset of homo-sapiens,[44] we have been composed of a social nature and as a result, we have had a pressing need to establish social stability through justice as well.

However, what this does not preclude is a simplistically reduced notion of sociability, in which we stand like a bunch of domesticated cattle, exerting no or little will or experiencing no jouissance. Quite the contrary, in fact, because sociality develops amongst more complex forms of life alongside a type of intelligence or reasoning. Kropotkin indicated that this intelligence is related to another instinct which involves the exertion of the ego, since a complex intelligence also produces a consciousness of its own existence. But it is more than just a simple reaction of the ego, since intelligence and consciousness actually requires the ability to recognize “self” (and even more importantly, degrees of similitude) in the “other,” and therefore is also a social phenomenon. We can see even a level of developed consciousness amongst dogs that shows the capacity to learn and reflect, and Kropotkin argued that intelligence is primarily a social faculty, especially since, as Morris puts it, “language, imitation, and accumulated experience as well as individual initiative and agency are intrinsically linked to the development of social life and intelligence.”[45]

These two major instincts, which could be loosely categorized as ego and sympathy, produce what could be described as a type of anxiety, which, particularly in humans, forms a major component of behaviour and psychology. To Kropotkin, this anxiety produces a paradox which begs a philosophical question of practical necessity. He noted two seemingly counter tendencies in human nature that required attention:

In one set are the feelings which induce man to subdue other men in order to utilize them his individual ends, while those of the other set induce humans to unite for attaining common ends by common effort: the first answering to a fundamental need of human nature – struggle, and the other representing another equally fundamental tendency – the desire of unity and mutual sympathy.[46]

However, Kropotkin’s answer is not to repress what he considers the more base or vulgar instincts, but rather towards developing a type of synthesis in moral philosophy and matters of politics that manifest themselves in a respect for the nature of the human animal.[47] Basically put, humans are by nature conflicted and instead of repressing our instincts, we need to produce a reality based upon manifesting them in the least harmful manner.

It is precisely in this regard that Saul Newman’s critique of Kropotkin as a product of Manichean dualism is excessive. Despite Kropotkin’s desire to pose the interests of the state against those of the people, he nonetheless declares that human bahaviours, such as domination, are indeed human nature proper. Greed (hoarding) and other so-called unsavoury behaviours are manifestations of primary human instincts and manifest themselves as anti-social only because the society in which they emerge has yet to alleviate their necessity, answer their problematic nature, or is a society of ressentiment.

Die Hard: Che Guevara and the Heroic Myth

Like Nietzsche, Kropotkin saw courage and conflict as a crucial part of the human spirit. However, to Kropotkin, the heroic deed (the act of utilizing courage in conflict) was not only just a manifestation of the need to excel individually (and in this sense I would argue that the hero is the manifestation of the need to personalize – and even anthropomorphize – historical or mythological events), but it was also an incredibly socialistic phenomenon (perhaps born out of the anxiety of the two?). The hero provides us with an individual with which we can invest the force of a social phenomenon into and this myth can serve to provide us with inspiration to excel. For example, Che Guevara, was not the force behind the Cuban revolution. All of the force of individuals acting together (peasant associations, trade unions, etc.) came together in this mythological figure who became the revolutionary hero. Significantly, it is precisely because of Che’s death and martyrdom, that he was able to accumulate such mythological power. The living hero is around to contradict the myth through perceived experience, but the martyr is pure mythos. In this way, Che Guevara can become pure inspiration. One doesn’t even have to be a socialist to utilize him as a hero, which is also part of his appeal and why you can find Che shirts and memorabilia in junk and trinket stores throughout the world – he can be anything to anyone. At one node Che assumes the role of the model for communist revolution, at another he can inspire Muslim perseverance, and at another point he becomes the James Dean rebel without a cause for suburban college student chic.

And in this mythological heroism[48] we witness a significant junction where Kropotkin transcends the very Manichean logic which he is accused of by Newman. In fact, Kropotkin describes this pressing desire for courage and perseverance in very Nietzschean terms, explaining, “Man is not content with ordinary, commonplace existence; he seeks the opportunity to extend its limits, to accelerate its tempo, to fill it with varied impressions and emotional experiences.”[49] Indeed, the strength to act in accordance with a spirit of adventure and play is a manifestation of will. Kropotkin’s will also encapsulates, but is not limited to, Nietzsche’s will to power, but its make-up is also where the agency required for altruism, or as Kropotkin preferred to call it, magnanimity, resides. This particular manifestation of agency combined with the sympathetic instinct emerge in sublime actions of self-sacrifice that provide the substance for heroic mythos: the hero cannot cheat death and it is the hero’s very acceptance of death that allows them to persevere, whether or not they become a martyr; it is the hero’s very readiness to meet death that makes their actions truly heroic. However, it is not even this capacity that humanity is even unique in the animal kingdom. As Kropotkin points out, “Self-sacrifice for the good of the family or of the group is a common fact in the animal world; and man, as a social creature, does not, of course constitute an exception.”[50] Not even in our courageous acts are humans particular in the world. So where does the significance of the hero lie in the establishment of morality particular to humanity (remembering, of course, that in Darwinian logic humans are different from other life only in degrees, not in essence)?

The heroic deed is not only an act of supreme courage – an ultimate exertion of the will – but it is also an ideological function, and here it is where its particular human component is manifested. In elucidating Guyau’s theories, Kropotkin suggests that in our consciousness emerges the concept of surplus, which is a recognition of our ability to exert more forces than is required for our own self-preservation.[51] Because of this consciousness, we understand that “there are more thoughts in our mind, and that there is in our heart more sympathy, or even more love, more joy, more tears, than is required for our self-preservation; and so we give them to others without concerning ourselves as to the consequences.”[52] Beyond sustenance is fecundity and it is from surplus consciousness that all specific human culture emerges, interacting and producing amongst each other, developing common languages and concepts.

With the consciousness of surplus forces is also the innate knowledge that not only can our forces be given freely, but also that they can be hoarded and exploited; and it was this capacity inherent within the human psyche that Nietzsche understood so fully. Kropotkin referred to these tendencies to exploit or dominate as anti-social, and pointed out that although they were pervasive, they were far from sufficient to account for the breadth of all human experience that transcended mere self-preservation. Indeed, “side by side with the anti-social tendencies there exists also a striving for sociality, for life harmonizing with the life of society as a whole, and the latter tendencies are no less strong than the former. Man strives for good neighbourly relations and for justice.”[53]

This fecundity present in surplus of agency also produced another type of adventurism – the intellectual risk. It is here that ideology, myth, and science reside: i.e. the faculty of building a daring hypothesis… and of deriving one’s morality from this hypothesis. All the prominent social reformers were guided by one or the other conception of the possible better life of mankind, and although unable to prove mathematically the desirability and the possibility of rebuilding a society in some particular direction, the reformer, who is in this respect closely akin to the artist, devoted all his life, all his abilities, all his energy to working for this reconstruction.[54]

It is here that Kropotkin hits upon a kernel relating to ideological formation. It is in the recognition of the future as a concept that humans are able to curb our immediate desires and impulses. Without the capacity to recognize past and future there would be no morality proper or ideology to speak of. It is precisely the recognition that something better may be arrived at in the future, and the utilization of history to provide examples, that we would devote our energies to repressing certain immediate tendencies. Further, it is through our capacity as social creatures with highly evolved linguistic capacities that we develop those tendencies communally, in junction with one another. Thus, the ethic and the ideology are developed dialectically in conjunction with each other and this is what is so unique about human morality.

The Herd of Will and Agency

Nietzsche makes no illusions as to his distaste for the herd or the rabble. He readily invests in it all of Europe’s sickness – the obsession with morality based in ressentiment. However, Kropotkin’s theory flips Nietzsche’s perspective of the herd on its head and transvalues it to a certain extent. This is because to Kropotkin, the herd is simply a description of a type of animal behaviour that is observable in nature, organically a manifestation of the mututal aid principle, and humans are a herd animal through and through. This nature, however, does not run counter to individualism, nor is it antithetical to creativity, art, jouissance, or bravery. Indeed, all assertions of individual will can only be defined through their experiential relation to others. Art only becomes art proper, that is, it ceases to be ‘art’ therapy, when it is viewed by an other who can perceive it (perception here is not solely limited to vision). The notion of a fully atomistic individual, like the notion of a purely collective-type entity (notice how difficult it is for the crew of Star Trek’s USS Enterprise to imagine the motivations of the borg) is indeed so inconceivable to human consciousness, that it becomes an almost fetishistic impossibility. Even the solitary ‘mountain-man’ or ‘sage’ is indebted to the herd for the provision of their clothing, food, security, etc., and their life is typically associated with a type of insanity, often of a divinitive nature, but something that we might today classify as ‘cabin fever.’

Nietzsche’s herd concept, while somewhat essentialist and dualistic, is nonetheless not so simple as to suggest that the herd is something to be abolished. Certainly the herd is something that is plebeian,[55] and therefore it is reasonable that this instinct manifest itself amongst the plebeian classes. However, according to Nietzsche, it is not the herd morality – ressentiment – that should permeate society, but rather the morality of nobility. Basically, he is calling for the complete overturning of a morality that favours the weak and chastises the strong. That’s a great idea, but the dualism implied here is unnecessary and somewhat inaccurate.

The herd is not a brainless mass like Yeaworth’s 1958 classic the Blob,[56] it is simply the establishment of consensus amongst those that consider themselves relative equals. That consensus can at times be incredibly frightening is not contestable – no one of sound mind will ever accuse humans acting in unison of coming to consistently good conclusions. But the idea of the herd is drawn from false assumptions as to the mentality of leadership (the act of an individual) and following (the act of joining the herd). The picture of the follower as a brainless automaton without will is excessive. Followers are not simply passive participants, they make decisions as to whom to follow and when, exerting an act of will in order to combine their will with those of others of be given direction as to where to place their surplus will. In contrast to the ruler and ruled, where power is structured in such a manner that domination over secures the relationship on behalf of the ruler and the ruled are characterized by their lack of interest to do anything about it (an example of one type of herd mentality), the follower is the one who actively chooses and wills their participation, who chooses their leader – the leader is the recipient of the voluntary will of the follower, selected on the basis of their skills or charisma or some other characteristic defined as desirable through the relative consensus of their followers (the herd).

This faulty logic has dominated European a priori assumptions on the nature of morality, constituting the conflict between Hobbesian and Rousseauian discourses, and continues to do so even to this day to some extent. The alternative, taken up by a number of socialists who didn’t want to admit to certain natures in humanity, was to propose that there was no nature in humans; that we are the transcendent animal. However, Kropotkin saw in Darwin’s concept of nature a force that undermined this split that needed to show human nature as inherently good or bad in order to establish its case, and therefore also something that the socialist project needed to contend with. Nietzsche and Kropotkin both moved well beyond either of these simplistic perspectives, but Kropotkin’s understanding of what he called ‘primitive peoples’ was far more advanced than Nietzsche’s and he was able to observe first hand, living amongst the natives of Siberia, that pre-statist and pre-capitalist forms of social organization in which the concept of individual as part and parcel to tribe predominated, were not characterized by a lack of individual excellence or agency. According to Morris,

Kropotkin did not view customary rules and common opinion as inherently antagonistic to individual autonomy and expression. Nor did he ever think of the human person as an asocial individual – the very idea of a human individual being “against” or outside of society he thought nonsense. The human person was neither in opposition to “society” nor simply an “effect” of language, culture, discourses, or social custom – as depicted by many cultural anthropologists and postmodern theorists. [57]

We see then that the herd concept, especially as opposed to the autonomous individual, expressed throughout European discourse is a hasty overgeneralization of collective agency, which is at the very least complex, multifarious and composed of a varied set of behaviours, encapsulating not only the phenomenon of the ruled, but also that of followers. It is in this sense that the herd is liberated from the shackles of Manichean discourse. To deride the herd is to be self-loathing, for it is an aspect of human nature which we all participate in and provides us a level of comfort acquired through the relative predictability of human behaviours. In this sense, the herd exposes a degree of ressentiment in Nietzsche’s thinking.

Cruelpotkin

However, one of the most crucial elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy of morals, and one that Kropotkin regretfully ignored in his discourse, is the nature of cruelty as a constructive and primary human emotive pattern. Indeed, cruelty might even be considered a crucial part of our nature. Even today, at the apex (thus far) of human rights discourse and derision of domination – the sublime pinnacle of Nietzsche’s ressentiment society – we still laugh at injury and cruelty. It forms a primary element of many of our joyful pleasures; slapstick is but one manifestation of the joy we derive from watching others get injured. I cannot help but think of how many movies feature the bride getting her head hit on the doorframe as she is being carried across the threshold. Why? Because it is funny. Why? Because we have a natural joyful instinct to witnessing pain and the contextualized irony of the added tragedy (it is supposed to be a delicate, sensuous moment and it is undermined by the pain of being struck) is the cruel streak of our nature exhibiting itself.

This element of human nature, announced so boldly by Nietzsche, is something that problematizes ideological structures and needs to be addressed if there is to be any practical movement towards a differing system of social, political and economic organizing. This is where Kropotkin’s synthesis is most interesting, however, since it shows that he fully understood that a moral groundwork cannot be laid by simply paving over half of our natures. This has serious repercussions for anarchist thought, and if anarchists wish to build socio-economic praxis, it must be a factor that is tackled not through repression of such instincts, but rather through the creative channeling of such potentially harmful, yet constructive impulses. The human species is at the point where it actually does have the capacity to reduce itself to extinction within a matter of days, something that was not the case in Nietzsche’s time and was not something considered extensively in his thought (although it must be admitted that Nietzsche did recognize the potential of humans to eviscerate the environment and that to him this was quite a frightening proposition, for it represented the ultimate split between humans and nature, a final ressentiment; first one hates one’s own nature and then one hates nature altogether).

Of course, one final thing I must mention is this: The Darwinian concept of evolution recognizes a fluidity of nature – nothing is static. The manner in which biological organisms evolve is through adaptations and mutations of the genes of individual organisms within their changing environment. If a sufficient number of mutations or adaptations occur in a species through a period of intense environmental change and those adaptations allow those members of the species to survive, then they will have progressed on an evolutionary path through adaptation and/or mutation. However, humans, more than any other species on earth, have the ability to adapt our environment to us and, unlike sharks, we are a highly adaptable species in the first place. This is one of the strengths of our capacity for consciousness and innovation. Basically, this also means that human evolution follows a dialectical path in which adaptation to our environment and adaptation of our environment to us, occur simultaneously. This further confounds the ability to understand exactly what constitutes human nature and what instincts are repressed. Fortunately, psychological theory, although still in its infancy, has been able to illuminate some basic drives and show us what in particular we are repressing and how these forms of repression can be divined (if you will) through an understanding of the symptom. Yet there is still a great deal of controversy, as there should be, in psychological theory as to what constitutes a biological nature and what constitutes a social phenomenon in humans.

This confusion, along with the recognition that humans are adapting and adaptable, while at the same time constructing an environment for whatever purpose, whether we are conscious of it or not, are also affecting our nature through various networks of agency. However, our forcing of our nature is not as significant as some post-modern theorists would postulate, since evolutionary time is set by the birth of new generations in the species and humans are not only relatively long-lived mammals but are also significantly increasing the length of time occurring between generations (whereas at one point humans were producing a new generation within 15 year spans, now, especially in affluent societies, it is common not to have children until one is in their thirties – that is roughly double the generation gap).

In the end, we are still a species with a nature. After all, we are still drawn to, and mesmerized by shiny objects (excluding of course, those born without sight). So ignoring that there are a number of things in particular that differentiates humans from badgers would be a crucial mistake. The accidental discourse of Kropotkin and Nietzsche provides an interesting departure point for such investigations that have immediate and very real repercussions, especially when contextualized in politics.

Works Cited

Avramova, Zoya V. “Heterochromatin in Animals and Plants: Similarities and Differences”

Kaufmann, Walter, trans. 2000. Basic Writings of Nietzsche (Toronto, Random House)

Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Ethics: Origin and Development (Montreal, Black Rose Books)

Max, Edward E. “Plagiarized Errors and Molecular Genetics: Another argument in the evolution-creation controversy”

Moore, John, ed. 2004. I Am Not A Man, I Am Dynamite: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition (Brooklyn, Autonomedia)

Morris, Brian. 2004. Kropotkin: The Politics of Community (New York, Humanity Books)

Wikipedia (en.wikipedia.org)

Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York, Verso)

Footnotes

[1] Rache. [translator's footnote]

[2] Gerechtigkeit. [translator's footnote]

[3] Nietzsche, Freidrich. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic from Kaufmann, Walter, trans. 2000. Basic Writings of Nietzsche (Toronto, Random House); pp. 509-510.

[4] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Ethics: Origin and Development (Montreal, Black Rose Books); pp. 233-234.

[5] Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York, Verso); p. 102.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid. p. 79

[8] Laclau, Ernesto. 1989. “Preface” in Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York, Verso); p. xv.

[9] Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. Op Cit. pp. 79-80.

[10] If this is in doubt, consider that thousands of years of building engineering knowledge has culminated to the point where a group of people (refugees in this case, without access to construction aid) is stranded in the desert, they will be able to construct stable, squared buildings from water and sand with relative ease. Such refugee cities with populations larger than most ancient cities have existed throughout the twentieth century, whereas our ancestors of 3000 years ago would have not a hope in hell of producing such a city, as they had yet to accumulate vast amounts of knowledge in such condensed syntheses.

[11] Hopefully, I feel, is a necessary prefix for Hegel’s theory of progress. To exclude the possibility of any objective understanding from the onset is simply dogma that allows one to convert relativism from something relative itself and something conditional into a form of religious nihilism. However, the nature of an accumulation of understanding also bears the potential to lead in a direction of our own physical nihilism (annihilation).

[12] Morris, Brian. 2004. Kropotkin: The Politics of Community (New York, Humanity Books); pp. 129-130.

[13] I do not feel the need to address the weakness of economic materialism in this paper. It has been dealt with thoroughly in contemporary discourse and it should suffice to say that Nietzsche’s a priori logic of markets being preceded by credit and debt requires an in-depth inquiry, as it suggests that there exists a natural, primary human instinct towards credit and debt. Kropotkin’s theory, on the other hand, would view credit and debt as a secondary effect of the instinct for equity (justice), explaining more adequately the need to mathematically “balance the books.”

[14] Nietzsche, Freidrich. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Op Cit. p. 503.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Nietzsche, Freidrich. Beyond Good and Evil from Kaufmann, Walter, trans. 2000. Basic Writings of Nietzsche (Toronto, Random House); p. 381.

[17] Ibid. pp. 379-382. Nietzsche’s characterization of the English, by the way, does not pass the attention of John Cleese, who in his 1988 film A Fish Called Wanda, has Kevin Kline’s character Otto, an American con-artist obsessed with Nietzsche, constantly belittling the British for their ‘inferior’ and ‘stodgy’ cultural morality.

[18] Ibid. p. 381.

[19] Nietzsche, Freidrich. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Op Cit. p. 473.

[20] Ibid. p. 470.

[21] Newman, Saul. 2000. “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment” in Moore, John, ed. 2004. I Am Not A Man, I Am Dynamite: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition (Brooklyn, Autonomedia); p. 107.

[22] Ibid. pp. 114-115.

[23] Ibid. p. 119.

[24] Ibid. p. 118.

[25] To tell the truth, I am partial to this theory myself, having arrived at a similar “orgasmic garden” conceptualization of revolution, in which strategy is based on multifarious techniques and visions that tackle domination in a network fashion. Plus, who wants just one big orgasm, when it is possible to have millions?

[26] Newman, Saul. 2000. Op Cit. p. 124.

[27] Nietzsche, Freidrich. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Op Cit. p. 472.

[28] Ibid. Op Cit. p. 469.

[29] Ibid. p. 532.

[30] Newman, Saul. 2000. Op Cit. p. 122.

[31] I do consider myself to be a post-modernist and yet I believe in a universal truth. I am suspicious of scientific methodology of inquiry, but I also believe in things like electrons and evolution, and that there are observable truths, which are clues to the logic of the universe. This only becomes a contradiction if one is to reduce post-modernist thought to a simple rejection of the principle of universal truth. Just because a universal truth is imperceptible to humans in its totality does not mean that it is non-existent. I consider a dogmatic adherence to the bold, yet presumptuous rejection of all notions of universalism to be a form of shitty post-modernism. We can reject the existence of phenomena, claiming that gravity, for example, is a trick. But such a proposition is absurd. We may experience gravity slightly differently, being different humans, but we experience it nonetheless. If gravity turns out not to exist as we conceive of it currently, then it is not because the phenomenon is lacking in truth, only that we have misrecognized the functioning of the universal.

[32] Morris, Brian. 2004. Op Cit. p. 132.

[33] Ibid. pp. 132-133.

[34] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 9.

[35] It is common knowledge that humans share roughly 99.9% of our DNA with each other, at least 95% of our DNA in common with chimpanzees (imagine reading a book and then reading another book where 95%-97% of the words are exactly the same – nature is the best plagiarist), that the core components of DNA in all mammalia is generally the same, and even plants have similarities to humans (See Avramova, Zoya V. “Heterochromatin in Animals and Plants: Similarities and Differences” http://www.plantphysiol.org/cgi/content/full/129/1/40). For a comprehensive argumentation of similitude in DNA and against creationism see: Max, Edward E. “Plagiarized Errors and Molecular Genetics: Another argument in the evolution-creation controversy” http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/molgen/

[36] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 294.

[37] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ants. (4 November 2005)

[38] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euphausia_superba. (4 November 2005)

[39] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biomass. (4 November 2005) Of course, the krill are not to be taken as a model of sociability and this is not to argue that they have any significant level of sentience, only that Kropotkin’s mutual aid theory is far from baseless.

[40] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 31.

[41] Nietzsche, Freidrich. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Op Cit. pp. 498-499, 507-507.

[42] Ibid. p. 507.

[43] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 304.

[44] Homo habilis might likely have been incredibly social as well. This speculation is based upon the hypothesis that this primitive ancestor was possibly capable of rudimentary speech and communication is one of the indicators of advanced sociability. The extinction of robustus, despite their superior size, may have been a result of competing in an environment with the quite likely more sociable creatures that are our direct ancestors.

[45] Morris, Brian. 2004. Op Cit. p. 156.

[46] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 22.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Although it must be noted that Kropotkin never pursued the notion of mythological heroism and only hinted at how it could function in his theorization on morality.

[49] Kropotkin is here explaining an element of J.M. Guyau’s theory on morality, but it is in concordance with Kropotkin’s ideas and Kropotking himself felt a strong affinity for Guyau’s theories. Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 22

[50] Kropotkin, Peter. 1992. Op. Cit. p. 329.

[51] Ibid. p. 324.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid. pp. 326-327.

[54] Ibid. p. 329.

[55] See Nietzsche, Freidrich. On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Op Cit. pp. 461-462.

[56] The blob is almost the perfect extension of the terrible Nietzschean fear of herd mentality. It can’t be rationed with and it will continue to grow until it has exhausted its purpose, which in this case is most terrifying, because its sole purpose is continuous expansion – a will to power of its own.

[57] Morris, Brian. 2004. Op Cit. p. 182.

There is little doubt that Zionism still occupies a place of prominence in the construction of Israeli and Palestinian identities and lies at the core of the current conflict that emerged as a result of its introduction to Palestine in the late 1800s. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionism has positioned itself as the ever-increasingly salient marker for the status quo of Jewish identity and has managed to intellectually, emotionally and politically bind the existence of a state, Israel, to the health, well being, and even the existence of the Jewish people as a whole. However, since the introduction of the post-Zionist debate emerging from within Israel itself, the strength of Zionism’s ability to represent the Jewish people as a whole has begun to show signs of cracking. The significance of the post-Zionist discourse has partially been that the critique of Zionism, and the state of Israel in particular, have come under serious scrutiny from intellectuals, activists and subcultures within Israel, and the considerable volume of work produced and engaged in by these people has made it more difficult to dismiss than critics living outside of Israel. Important thinkers such as Maxime Rodinson[1] and Noam Chomsky, while themselves Jewish, have traditionally been dismissed as “self loathing” by defenders of Israeli practices and (mostly) right-wing and labour Zionist ideologues. Additionally, non-Jewish intellectuals and authors have been charged with anti-Semitism over even minor criticisms of Israel that if leveled against other states, would be thoroughly uncontroversial. Of course, this is not even to mention the Israeli non-Jewish Arab population, who has been very critical of the state, especially since 1967, but whose voice has never been given any serious consideration.

At this point, however, I should note that, as pointed out by Rodinson, when discussing Zionism, many anti-Zionists tend to oversimplify this form of nationalism and refuse to make any distinctions between its incipient divergences.

In general, anti-Zionist opinion, especially among the Arabs, refuses to distinguish among Israeli patriotism and nationalism, a pro-Israeli attitude, recognition of the legitimate existence of a state of Israel, observation that a new Israeli nation has been formed, and the traditional Palestino-centric attitude of religious Jews. All this is thrown together in the concept of ‘Zionism’.[2]

This is not the intent here. Rather, this is an examination of the notions of nationalist ideology and how it has contributed to the assumptions underlying Israeli policy, regardless of what particular stream or subcategory of Zionism we are dealing with. At the same time, it is important to be able to separate the legitimacy of the existence and presence of Jewish people on the land of Palestine and Israel[3] from the hegemony of ethno-nationalism that currently dominates the thinking on this topic and clouds the reality of cultural evolution and pluralism that bears the potential to excise the people involved from this quagmire of power politics.

With the emergence of post-Zionism, an arena was opened for the Jewish citizens of Israel to begin to seriously reconsider the ideological and moral foundations of the state that acted in their name, educated them, and provided them with a meta-narrative against which they would identify themselves. It provided a potential path, albeit still limited at this juncture, for a rejection of narrow nationalism and state-defined identities. Of course, Zionism is still in force in Israel and as of this point in time, the only serious challenge to Zionism’s progress since its inception, has been the Palestinian resistance, and most significantly, the intifada. Much like many other post-colonial movements (and I would venture to say, any movements built out of systems of oppression or exploitation), the ultimate responsibility for resisting occupation and oppression is shouldered by the dominated and the first fissures in the meta-narratives of the population that benefits from, or identifies with[4] the inequitable distribution of power, is provided by a popular uprising with clear denunciation of the status-quo. It is only at this point that the colonial population will be shaken from their comfort zone and begin to question their assumptions, for better or for worse.

However, when examining the pluralism of Israeli and Palestinian society, their relationship to universal values and dogmas, and how ideology continues to play a crucial role in political and social conflict, certain questions become unavoidable. First, what are the ideological roots behind the systems that inform day-to-day life in Israel and construct the assumptions of the allowable social discourse? Secondly, to what extent does ethno-nationalism influence the policies of the state apparatus? Furthermore, what are the more salient contradictions or features of Zionism’s historical outlooks, promises and actions that lead to the construction of a powerful colonial state, now standing at a juncture at which the mythos it has enshrined are in conflict with each other to the degree that the people within its borders must ask themselves whether it will be a liberal democratic regime (a transitional phase to a truly egalitarian and just society at best, full of a myriad of its own contradictions), a tyranny (the form of governance most prone to repression of the human will), or some other form of social and economic organization (perhaps even one that includes the integration of liberal individualism with socialist collectivism)?

The nationalist struggle in the Middle East – and the rest of the world as well – has limited the possible solutions to the current conflict to the realm of states that are the only bodies capable of representing “their people”. The nation state, even when it is a state that is composed of many potential or past nations, legitimates its monopoly of violence vis-à-vis a collective identity in which the entire polis is defined by its national character as defined by the institutions of the state, regardless of whether there is any common thread binding the population, or “citizenry” of that particular geographically delineated region. Zionism, like all other nationalisms before it, serves the state and the state only.[5] Whether it is a nascent tendency or an institutional reality, and contrary to the claims of the nationalist philosophers, it reduces the individual to a mere cog in the political and economic machinery of institutionalized power.

Nationalism, Socialism and Zionism

Zionism is a brand of European nationalism that emerged alongside the German, Polish, Romanian, Slovakian, Serbian and Ukrainian national movements. [6] Zeev Sternhell describes this type of nationalism as “organic nationalism” and asserts that it developed in a different set of circumstances than western European (ie. French) nationalism, giving it a distinct set of characteristics, not the least of which was a suspicion of the liberalism that radiated out of France after its revolution. According to Sternhell, western European nationalism grew predominantly out of an “expression of an allegiance to a single independent authority”, whereas the eastern European national movements tended to develop as a result of “religion, language, and culture, which were very readily regarded as reflecting biological or racial differences.” [7] The common thread uniting all of these particular brands of nationalism, and Zionism is no exception, is that each one of these groups of national identities was forged in opposition to a dominant and often oppressive state actor, in which the dominant power was easily discerned by its differences (in language, ethnicity, history, etc.) from the nascent national grouping.

This “organic” nationalism provided both the intellectual foundations and the raison d’être for its existence. The nascent ethnic states of Europe forged against the occupation of the French revolutionary empire and other imperial ventures would bear little allegiance to the liberal ideas that emerged as part of the enlightenment, and tribalesque blood allegiances would form the essential characteristics in the legitimation of the state. This tribalism came at the expense of any people identified as stemming from outside of the nation and would eventually lead to a number of nationalist socialist models that were primarily preoccupied with affixing a historical and social territorial destiny to the nation. However, it needs to be understood that these models, while describing themselves as socialist, were actually a far cry from the universalism enshrined in more consistent variants of socialist thought and praxis.

Two streams of this nationalist socialism emerged as German National Socialism and Jewish labour Zionism. The distinguishing characteristic of German nationalism was that it had already produced a state by the time its nationalist socialism had emerged and its nationalist socialism manifested itself as an inherently imperialistic system obsessed with territorial ethnic domination. However, as attested to by Sternhell, the Jewish nationalist socialism “was not a movement of imperial conquest, nor, essentially, a revolt against the heritage of the Enlightenment, but simply a path of rescue for an endangered people.” [8]

Nonetheless, the nationalism that developed in western Europe, and especially that of France which was highly dependent upon an importation of labour to maintain its economic dominance (limiting any potential tribalism of French nationalism), while developed in conjunction with liberalism, was only responsible to the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment insofar as it further justified the state and market institutions. It was no true guarantor of cultural pluralism or individual and collective rights. In fact, just as Zionism can be traced to “organic” nationalism, so “organic” nationalism can be traced to the establishment of the “great” French state. In describing the contradictory nature of German nationalism, Rudolf Rocker argues that “many of the advocates of the German national idea never realized that they owed their apparent liberation not to their German exclusiveness, but to those very “foreign influences” against which their “Germanism” fought with such Berzerker rage.” [9] He concludes that “this misshapen political brat… was nothing more than a greater Prussia come to power, which had changed Germany into a gigantic barracks and with its insane militarism and its definite aims of world political power now assumed the same fateful role which Bonaparte had up to that time played in Europe.” [10] Essentially, the potential for barbarism, imperialism, tyranny, and militarism was not exclusive to German nationalism and was in fact inherited to a great extent (as the “rules of the game”) from the legacy of French colonialism in Germany.

Additionally, the European colonial model was marked by its cohabitation with the legitimating processes of nationalism, whether it was French western nationalism, German “organic” nationalism, or any other variant thereof. Rodinson recognized three basic categories of ethnic-national ideologies and formations. These categories are: unorganized ethnic groups, [11] ethnic-national states, and empires. [12] For the ethnic-national state and the empire, the relationship to colonialism is simply a representation of the political power structure at play and can represent different developmental stages of nationalism. According to Rodinson, Empires are simply

state units within which one ethnic group… dominates others. These are powerful formations which develop an ideology of their own separate from or standing above the ethnic ideologies. If, as sometimes happens, the various ethnic groups tend to fuse within it, then the case of the ethnic-national state re-emerges. [13]

In the context of European nationalism, colonialism developed easily, contradicting only with the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment, and Zionism as an inheritor of this tradition, took to the notions of colonialism with little difficulty. This is evidenced by the complete lack of concern about incorporating a dialogue with the inhabitants of Palestine into any early Zionist strategy. [14]

All of the above-mentioned nationalist dialogues helped to inform, fuel and manifest the unique character of Zionism, which through its colonial experiment later informed the identity and nature of the state of Israel, including its hegemony over the Jewish diaspora. However, Zionism was developed not only as a brand of ethnic nationalism, but was also packaged with the values of the Enlightenment to the degree that it claimed to be socialist and liberal. But the values of universal humanism attached to socialism and liberalism are highly incompatible with the state-tribalism inherent in nationalism and especially that of “organic” ethnic-nationalism, and has lead to a number of glaring contradictions in the mythos of the state of Israel that need to be resolved if there is to be any real sustainable peace in the Middle East.

The Mythos of Liberalism and Socialism in Zionism

The real contradictions of ethnic nationalism and socialism lay not so much in the founding practices of Israel as the founding mythos of Israel. Essentially, the founders of the state, Ben Gurion, Katznelson and the rest of the labour-Zionist camp, were far more influenced by the ethnic tribalism of Aaron David Gordon than the liberalism of Theodore Herzl, who, along with Nordau, never actually reached Palestine. [15] Indeed, if ever there was a doubt between the principles of nationalism and those of socialism within the early Zionist movement (it is irrelevant to even speak of socialism after 1948), the primacy of the nation was never in doubt. Gordon, who abhorred socialism, fully understood the contrary nature of combining two universalisms that stood in contradiction to each other. While socialism declared the common, universality of man, pitted against economic and political manifestations of social power, nationalism emphasized the primacy of a mystical bond of blood and soil.

Gordon grasped also that the commonality between liberalism and socialism was the conception of the individual as the base unit of society and the final object of all social activity. [16] This was contrary to his view that any acceptance of the liberal framework for the individual in society would have meant the end of the Jewish people as an autonomous unit. [17] Rather, he saw the individual as an extension of the nation, from which their very existence was owed. In Gordon’s thinking, the individual was an organic extension of blood from the soil of the motherland and that this set of factors forged the brunt of human identity regardless of an individual’s political or social standing.[18] In this sense, Gordon, and Katznelson after him, saw little use for reason or skepticism, or “excessive cerebralism”. The nation must be sustained through great cultural myths, and religion (even without a belief in God) was an ideal tool for the forging of a national identity.

The mythos approach to nation formation and state-building was embraced by Ben Gurion who was a consummate politician and understood that the mission in Eretz Yisrael needed a morally justifiable façade which it could operate under. The people of a future Zionist state were in need of great formative myths and an essentially moral mandate that justified the project and unified the nation. The concept of nationalist socialism was presented as the ultimately moral face of the Zionist project – a synthesis of socialist humanism and the reclamation of the Jewish soul from the “sickness” of diaspora life.

However, in reality, the process of social transformation was never even considered a viable proposition by the mainstream leadership of the Zionist movement. While collectivization of the land and labour was advocated and romanticized, the truth is that the so-called socialism of the Zionist movement was geared not to the control of productive forces or the transformation of social inequality, but the limitation of “parasitism.” The Jewish bourgeoisie who did not contribute to the hegemony of Jewish labour and the Zionist cause were, as in other nationalist socialist movements, considered “parasites.” All other exploiters of Jewish labour and the thriving Tel Aviv bureaucratic managerial classes were considered integral elements of the national struggle. Thus, when Gordon proclaimed “We all came here to be the nation and to be ourselves. A small minority came here in the name of socialism, bringing its teachings”,[19] he underlined the truth about the Zionist project, exposing the myth of the socialist intent of the nascent state.

The obvious hegemony of nationalism in Zionism is confirmed in the dealings of the labour movement’s organizations throughout its history. Although Gordon despised Ahdut Ha’avoda (The United Labour Party), its leaders, which included Ben Gurion and Katznelson, were profoundly influenced by Gordon and his organization, Hapo’el Hatza’ir (a violently anti-Marxist party). The influence of Anarchists, Marxists, and other serious socialists in the Mapam (United Workers Party), which was controlled by the Mapai (ruled de facto by Ben Gurion), and later the Histadrut (the same essential power structure), was negligible. Moreover, any efforts to incorporate the enterprise into the local population through mutual aid or shared collectivization were extremely marginal and fit under the category of “parasitic” activity. Even the noted pseudo-Marxist Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi framed his famous dismissal of Arab labour around the non-existence of an Arab Palestinian nation,[20] as though this was any answer to the question of the collapse of universal socialist principles. Instead, the question of Arab Palestinian labour was largely ignored until the creation of the Histadrut and the construction of the railroad in Palestine. [21] In this case, the Histadrut was forced to contend with the issue of Arab labour and whether or not they would be allowed to participate in what had been exclusively Jewish labour organizations.

The inability of the Histadrut to effectively deal with issue of Arab workers, also brought up at its founding meeting by members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), exhibits explicitly the subjugation of any real socialist program to the ethno-nationalist agenda of the Zionist policy makers. Furthermore, it underlines the inherent tensions and essentially incompatible natures of socialism and liberalism on one side and ethnic nationalism on the other.

Undeniably, Zionism rested upon the seizure of land that was already inhabited and the overrunning of the indigenous population by a colonial settlers’ movement, who’s mandate remained unquestionably the rulership of the land.[22] The essential tool of this was land settlement and acquisition of land by any means that did not alienate or significantly divide the settler population. The policy of land acquisition for ethnic settlement and national domination has retained its primacy in Israeli politics, albeit modified by changes in global systems, the Palestinian uprising, and the growing peace movement in Israel. However, despite the public spin placed on territorial domination and ethnic cleansing, Israel has remained true to this primary objective of the early Zionist movement.

Zionism as Policy

Unfortunately, when examining Zionism as a form of colonial ethnic-nationalism in Israeli policy, it is rarely, if ever, explicitly stated as a policy objective. Ariel Sharon, like Ben Gurion is a politician that is well prepared to create alternative public goals for a greater agenda. But this does not indicate by any means that the non-stated goals are not policy. Rather, as in politics in any state, any serious long-term policy operates as an assumption that informs all other related policies. Thus, when Sharon addressed the 34th Zionist Conference in Jerusalem in June of 2002, he could have meant a myriad of things in stating “The great Zionist journey will continue and attain its objectives, and, as has been proven time and time again – no obstacle will stand in its way.”[23] His intent could be argued as vehemently as any Christian scholars would debate the intent of the vague sayings of Jesus as recorded in the four gospels. Rather, it is the actions of the state that give its ideology meaning and consistency and therefore an exploration of practice is necessary to determine whether or not the state of Israel has departed from the initial policies elaborated by the early Zionist movement.

With regard to the subjugation of socialism to nationalist objectives, the basic state developmental model in Israel continued to develop along the path of ethnic nationalism. This led to a scenario where the major social institutions consistently moved in a conservative, chauvinistic and reactionary manner, eventually resulting in the dissolution of any dominant socialist ethos. According to Sternhell,

In many respects, the history of the labor movement may be seen as a continual drift to the right, a process in which the more radical principles, those closest to the aspiration of creating a more egalitarian society, were progressively eroded. The series of unifications, which led first to the founding of the Mapai and forty years later to the founding of the Labor Party, all had the same result: an increasing commitment to national goals rather than to those reflecting an aspiration to equality. Thus, from one unification to another, socialist identity was lost.[24]

This slide continues today, where the inheritors of the more reactionary stream of Zionism – Jabotinsky’s gang of thugs, the Revisionists – have moved into the position of political dominance within the state apparatus and have started to dismantle the social safety network and de-tooth the already ineffectual labour movement. As explained by Uri Ram,

In the socio-economic arena, the liberalization policy continued to intensify with every successive government. Since the mid-1980s, Israel has witnessed its first ‘bourgeois revolution’, in which the collective institutions founded by the labour movement fell like a house of cards, and the ‘privatization’ ethos, led by a now robust bourgeois class, took total precedence. This process reached a symbolic peak in 1994, when the Labour movement lost its historic command over the Histadrut…[25]

Coinciding with the deterioration of the labour movement, has been the continuation of a policy of settlement and land acquisition outside of the official borders of Israel – the occupied territories. The necessary result of this enterprise, of course, is the dispossession of the indigenous population of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) and Syria (the Golan Heights). Baruch Kimmerling has described the process of alienating and dispossessing the Arab population[26] as “politicide” and that this process “is a consequence of the 1967 War and, partially, of the very nature and roots of the Zionist movement”.[27]

Ariel Sharon has played a prominent role in establishing Israeli military, settlement, and domestic policy throughout his career and views the Palestinian people as the greatest existential threat to the existence of the ethnic state model that Israel has been founded on. Additionally, he has consolidated political power in Israel to a degree to which it has never previously known. Kimmerling sees Sharon as having transformed Israel, a Prussianesque military regime from its inception, into a “semi-fascist regime”.[28] Having exploited the reaction to the alienation of the Mizrahi (non-European, aka non-white) Jews by the traditionally dominant Ashkenazi (white European) elite, Sharon, along with his Likud predecessors, rode a wave of unprecedented electoral popularity at the polls, establishing a primarily right-wing Parliament. This has lead to the infusion of extremist neo-Zionist[29] parties into the discourse surrounding Israeli policy. The educational system has been saturated with neo-Zionist textbooks, partially as a result of this process and partly as a result of tireless activism by this fundamentalist subcategory of Zionism.[30]

Additionally, as a result of the hegemony of ethnic nationalism in the Israeli educational and socialization process, the dominant attitudes of the public are loathe to sacrifice the specific ethnic character of the state (or the state itself) for any security or for the realization of the liberal ideals that the state was allegedly founded on, should they come in conflict with each other.[31]

At the same time, land acquisition, the centerpiece of Zionist strategy, remains at the core of Israeli policy. This is attested to by a number of factors, not the least of which was the (generally) consistent acceleration of settlement in the occupied territories since their occupation in 1967 and the provision of state-based incentives for settlement. This process has gone through various stages since the War of 1967, influenced by international and domestic negotiations, but the state of Israel has consistently been able to increase the number of settlers in a country that was not legally theirs to control. In times of settlement-freeze, as in the terms agreed to in the US-backed Roadmap, the Israeli state puts its efforts into aiding the expansion of existing settlements[32] and often continues to legalize and establish new settlements under the context of “security” or providing resources to Israeli citizens, as was the case when the Sharon regime recently legalized several new settlements. Viewed in context of Zionism, this was always the method of annexing land and exerting de facto political control over territory. According to the Israeli human rights group, B’Tselem,

The Israeli administration has applied most aspects of Israeli law to the settlers and the settlements, thus effectively annexing them to the State of Israel. This has taken place although in formal terms the West Bank is not part of the State of Israel, and the law in effect there is Jordanian law and military legislation. This annexation has resulted in a regime of legalized separation and discrimination. This regime is based on the existence of two separate legal systems in the same territory, with the rights of individuals being determined by their nationality.[33]

Lending additional significance to this perspective is the factor that there has not been any non-occupational or imperial control of Palestine in the last several hundred years and that this has enabled the Zionist enterprise dramatically. A change in this scenario would likely put an end to this strategy and would convert Israeli policy from a settler-colonial dimension to focus on the potential of regional hegemony, something the Israeli state is highly disadvantaged at due to the hostility of the neighbouring states. Israel’s only potential options to expand its power-base at that point will be integration with the local economies and politics or imperialism.

For Sharon, however, this dilemma is compounded by the ideological and practical desire to “finish” the Palestinian problem and acquiring as much land as possible so that any possible Palestinian state will be a non-actor in Israeli politics. This, for all intents and purposes, harkens back to the arguments made by the exceptionally lucid, yet morally suspect, Vladimir Jabotinsky, who called for an Iron Wall (of course, Jabotinsky meant a metaphorical wall) that would crush the Palestinian spirit into submission, accompanied, one must assume, by an implied ethnic cleansing. Perhaps not so ironically, the wall[34] project that Sharon inherited from the previous regimes (indicating that the positions of Labour and Likud regarding basic Zionist precepts are not so divergent) is being utilized to produce similar results to Jabotinsky’s ideological wall, as well as serving as a de facto annexation of Palestinian land. B’Tselem describes this scenario in the organization’s assessment of the political context of the establishment of the wall:

Even if we accept Israel’s claim that the only way to prevent attacks is to erect a barrier, Israel is required to select the route that results in the fewest possible human rights violations. The planned route almost totally ignores this principle and is based on extraneous considerations which have little, if anything, to do with the security of Israeli civilians. One of the government’s primary considerations was inclusion of as many settlements as possible west of the barrier in order to increase the likelihood of their annexation into Israel.[35]

The process of divesting the Palestinian elites from the potential of forming a viable state is facilitated by the start and stop nature of the “peace” negotiations. Conspicuously missing from these so-called peace initiatives that have been underway since even before Oslo, is the possibility of a one-state solution. This is where the dominance of ethnic nationalism underscores the major contradictions between the “democratic” values and the ethnic character of the Israeli state. As long as the character of the state is based on the definition of the nation as an ethnic group, bound to the soil through blood and other fantastic mythologies, there can be no ultimate reconciliation with the individual-social framework of liberalism that celebrates plurality. The ultimate offence to the nature of the Zionist enterprise is the decommissioning of the national character of the state in favour of liberal or socialist values. While the majority of Israel’s population remains Jewish, the state can make such bold claims as being “the only democracy in the Middle East”, but as soon as that majority no longer exists, Israel returns to its ultimate existential dilemma: is it an ethnic state or is it a liberal state?

Conclusion

I would venture to say, that at these crossroads, the two state solution is but a minor, temporary remedy for far greater problems that will continue to plague the Israeli people as time marches forward and they will inevitably be forced to make the decision to either become subjects of an emerging ethnic fascism or to undo the social damage done by the legacy of Zionism and move towards a liberal, socialist and pluralistic coexistence with their neighbours.

Of course, the same responsibility is incumbent upon the Palestinians to dispense with their own brand of nationalism, but it should be noted that the Palestinian national identity was at least partially forged against the framework of Zionism. Additionally, as in any scenario where there is a distinct imbalance of power between concerned parties, the responsibility of ending a cycle of perpetual conflict resides with the stronger giving way to the weaker in exchange for nothing other than moral self-affirmation. However, as evidenced by the global feminist movement, as well as the South African anti-apartheid and the American civil rights movements, the ultimate responsibility to “get it done right” if at all, is transferred to the repressed population to force the issue upon, and inform the oppressor “by any means necessary”.

The people of Israel, having been faced with the reality of multifarious forms of resistance to not only the occupation, but essentially Zionism as a policy of Eretz Yisrael – and later Israel – from its inception to the integrated world of today, are capable of making a leap away from the chauvinistic nature of their state and forging a real peace, but only if Zionism and nationalism is dispensed with once and for all. Whether this happens with or without two states is incidental. The truth remains that the Israeli state, with its indispensable ethnic mandate and its vicious oligarchy, has been leading the people on a destructive path since even before its inception, killing the souls of “its” people (the alleged nation) and devastating all those in its path.

As exhibited in the new global activism, collectivism and spirit of co-operativism that has resurged since the late 1960s, the rapid forms of mass communication and transport have drawn the world together in such a manner that the universal humanism of liberalism and socialism is an ever-increasing possibility. However, the tribalistic ethnic state model has proven throughout its history just how destructive and misanthropic it can actually be. The creativity and diversity of culture, so valued by the Jewish diaspora before it was co-opted by the Zionist movement can be restored by a return to the celebration of pluralism and a rejection of the Jewish monoculture forced on it by national meta-narratives.[36]

Bibliography

Brenner, Lenni. The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (London: Zed Books, 1984)

Carey, Roane and Jonathan Shanin, eds. The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent. (New York: The New Press, 2002)

Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians. (London, New York: Verso, 2003)

Lockman, Zachary. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001)

Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003)

Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Michael E. Coughlin, Publisher, 1978, 1947)

Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983)

Rodinson, Maxime. Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Pathfinder, 1973)

Shlaim, Avi. War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History, Revised and Updated (New York: Penguin, 1995)

Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)

Weizfeld, Eibie, ed. The End of Zionism and the Liberation of the Jewish People. (Windsor: Clarity Press, 1989)

Notes

1. Maxime Rodinson, in addressing what he called Judeo-centrism, was compelled to answer allegations of self-loathing or denial of Jewish heritage, further asserting “Nationalism and religion proclaim our duty to rally to their banners, and accuse us of treason and cowardice if we fail to do so.” Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983) p. 10

2. Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983) p. 148

3. It is my belief, as an anarchist, that political boundaries operate to continually disrupt the organic flow of labour and cultural interchange and therefore are not legitimate in any context other than provincial outlines, useful for mailing addresses and such. Security concerns can be addressed in any manner of forms, but borders are typically maintained for preserving privileges of states and national economic exploitation, and therefore do not actually increase the security of the people on either side of the border, but actually act to intensify dangers by perpetuating state-based inequalities and national hatreds.

4. I include the term “identifies with” here because it is quite common for people to identify with their own oppressors when they are threatened by what they have been trained to view as “external” enemies. The manufacture of an “other” for the purposes is a common political tool to maintain an artificial semi-consensus and obedience to a dominant group within a society.

5. For a detailed argument of this, see Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Michael E. Coughlin, Publisher, 1978, 1947). Especially noteworthy is Chapter 12 pp. 200-212.

6. Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 10

7. Ibid. pp. 10-11

8. Ibid. p. 27

9. Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Michael E. Coughlin, Publisher, 1978, 1947) p. 225

10. Ibid. p. 226

11. The term “unorganized ethnic groups” is misleading and inaccurate for two major reasons. First, it implies that any meaningful ethnic organization can only occur on a state level or higher, intrinsically tying ethnicity to militarism. Second, it suggests that ethnic groups are inherently unrealized nationalities, disregarding the fluidity of ethnic and cultural development over time. The Jewish diaspora in the 19th century in all its parts was a far cry from the Jewish diaspora of the 5th century and represented different norms and tendencies in different places. Rodinson’s category is mistaken and shows an ideological weakness in the Marxism of the author rather than any flaw in his categorization of ethnic-nationalism.

12. Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983) pp. 119-120

13. Ibid. p. 120

14. “early Zionist perceptions of, and attitudes toward, the land and its indigenous Arab majority were profoundly influenced not only by a radically new nationalist appropriation of Jewish history and culture but also by the specific historical conjuncture within which Zionism emerged in Europe—the heyday of colonialism.” Lockman, Zachary. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

15. See Chapter One of Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) pp. 47 – 73

16. Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 59

17. Ibid. p. 55

18. Ibid.

19. Gordon, Aaron David. “To My Defeated Spiritual Brethren” (1919) in Writings p. 412 as quoted from Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)

20. Lockman, Zachary. Op Cit.

21. Ibid. see Chapter 2 “Labor Zionism and the Arab Working Class, 1920-1929″

22. For a more detailed exposition of this position see Rodinson, Maxime. Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Pathfinder, 1973). Subsequent analysis of the same issue has been prolific. The post-Zionist dialogue is rife with examples of this form of argumentation.

23. PM Sharon Addresses the 34th Zionist Congress. Jerusalem, 20 June 2002

24. Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 34

25. Ram, Uri. “From Nation-State to Nation—–State: Nation, History and Identity Struggles in Jewish Israel” in Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003) pp. 26-27

26. “Arab” is of course an insufficient terminology to describe the “other” in this discourse, as what it actually refers to is the indigenous non-Jewish and non-Zionist Jewish population. This argument has often been utilized to assert the lack of a true Palestinian identity and invalidate any Palestinian nationalism. This is incorrect however, as what it actually indicates is the homogenizing nature of nationalist hegemony. Not only has the Zionist program forced a meta-narrative upon the Jewish populations of the world, but it has also done great harm to Palestinian diversity by forcing different factions into a conflict over the right to impose and define a homogeneous Palestinian identity.

27. Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians. (London, New York: Verso, 2003) p. 4

28. Ibid. p. 5

29. I would tend to argue (against a number of post-Zionist authors) that neo-Zionism is by and large a manifestation of extremist right-wing ethnic nationalism ideologically influenced by the revisionism of the earlier Zionist movement, brought about by Likud’s partial shift to traditional Zionism and inability to bring the full revisionist program into the mainstream discourse without alienating its previous coalitions.

30. Pappé, Ilan. “The Square Circle: The Struggle for Survival of Traditional Zionism” in Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003) pp. 56-57

31. See Ghanem, As’ad, “Zionism, Post-Zionism and Anti-Zionism in Israel: Jews and Arabs in Conflict Over the Nature of the State” in Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003)

32. See “Fact Sheet” The Palestine Monitor.

33. “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank” B’Tselem.

34. Or separation barrier, or fence, or whatever other euphemism is employed to make it sound innocuous.

35. “The Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem.

36. For an advancement on this position see Nimni, Ephraim “From Galut to T’fusoth: Post-Zionism and the Dis> ]]> http://themartyrindex.com/words/zionism-as-policy-ethnic-nationalism-and-liberal-values-in-conflict/feed/ 0