Zionism as Policy: Ethnic Nationalism and Liberal Values in Conflict Posted by Marek Vermin on February 3rd, 2006
Introduction
There is little doubt that Zionism still occupies a place of prominence in the construction of Israeli and Palestinian identities and lies at the core of the current conflict that emerged as a result of its introduction to Palestine in the late 1800s. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionism has positioned itself as the ever-increasingly salient marker for the status quo of Jewish identity and has managed to intellectually, emotionally and politically bind the existence of a state, Israel, to the health, well being, and even the existence of the Jewish people as a whole. However, since the introduction of the post-Zionist debate emerging from within Israel itself, the strength of Zionism’s ability to represent the Jewish people as a whole has begun to show signs of cracking. The significance of the post-Zionist discourse has partially been that the critique of Zionism, and the state of Israel in particular, have come under serious scrutiny from intellectuals, activists and subcultures within Israel, and the considerable volume of work produced and engaged in by these people has made it more difficult to dismiss than critics living outside of Israel. Important thinkers such as Maxime Rodinson[1] and Noam Chomsky, while themselves Jewish, have traditionally been dismissed as “self loathing” by defenders of Israeli practices and (mostly) right-wing and labour Zionist ideologues. Additionally, non-Jewish intellectuals and authors have been charged with anti-Semitism over even minor criticisms of Israel that if leveled against other states, would be thoroughly uncontroversial. Of course, this is not even to mention the Israeli non-Jewish Arab population, who has been very critical of the state, especially since 1967, but whose voice has never been given any serious consideration.
At this point, however, I should note that, as pointed out by Rodinson, when discussing Zionism, many anti-Zionists tend to oversimplify this form of nationalism and refuse to make any distinctions between its incipient divergences.
In general, anti-Zionist opinion, especially among the Arabs, refuses to distinguish among Israeli patriotism and nationalism, a pro-Israeli attitude, recognition of the legitimate existence of a state of Israel, observation that a new Israeli nation has been formed, and the traditional Palestino-centric attitude of religious Jews. All this is thrown together in the concept of ‘Zionism’.[2]
This is not the intent here. Rather, this is an examination of the notions of nationalist ideology and how it has contributed to the assumptions underlying Israeli policy, regardless of what particular stream or subcategory of Zionism we are dealing with. At the same time, it is important to be able to separate the legitimacy of the existence and presence of Jewish people on the land of Palestine and Israel[3] from the hegemony of ethno-nationalism that currently dominates the thinking on this topic and clouds the reality of cultural evolution and pluralism that bears the potential to excise the people involved from this quagmire of power politics.
With the emergence of post-Zionism, an arena was opened for the Jewish citizens of Israel to begin to seriously reconsider the ideological and moral foundations of the state that acted in their name, educated them, and provided them with a meta-narrative against which they would identify themselves. It provided a potential path, albeit still limited at this juncture, for a rejection of narrow nationalism and state-defined identities. Of course, Zionism is still in force in Israel and as of this point in time, the only serious challenge to Zionism’s progress since its inception, has been the Palestinian resistance, and most significantly, the intifada. Much like many other post-colonial movements (and I would venture to say, any movements built out of systems of oppression or exploitation), the ultimate responsibility for resisting occupation and oppression is shouldered by the dominated and the first fissures in the meta-narratives of the population that benefits from, or identifies with[4] the inequitable distribution of power, is provided by a popular uprising with clear denunciation of the status-quo. It is only at this point that the colonial population will be shaken from their comfort zone and begin to question their assumptions, for better or for worse.
However, when examining the pluralism of Israeli and Palestinian society, their relationship to universal values and dogmas, and how ideology continues to play a crucial role in political and social conflict, certain questions become unavoidable. First, what are the ideological roots behind the systems that inform day-to-day life in Israel and construct the assumptions of the allowable social discourse? Secondly, to what extent does ethno-nationalism influence the policies of the state apparatus? Furthermore, what are the more salient contradictions or features of Zionism’s historical outlooks, promises and actions that lead to the construction of a powerful colonial state, now standing at a juncture at which the mythos it has enshrined are in conflict with each other to the degree that the people within its borders must ask themselves whether it will be a liberal democratic regime (a transitional phase to a truly egalitarian and just society at best, full of a myriad of its own contradictions), a tyranny (the form of governance most prone to repression of the human will), or some other form of social and economic organization (perhaps even one that includes the integration of liberal individualism with socialist collectivism)?
The nationalist struggle in the Middle East - and the rest of the world as well - has limited the possible solutions to the current conflict to the realm of states that are the only bodies capable of representing “their people”. The nation state, even when it is a state that is composed of many potential or past nations, legitimates its monopoly of violence vis-à-vis a collective identity in which the entire polis is defined by its national character as defined by the institutions of the state, regardless of whether there is any common thread binding the population, or “citizenry” of that particular geographically delineated region. Zionism, like all other nationalisms before it, serves the state and the state only.[5] Whether it is a nascent tendency or an institutional reality, and contrary to the claims of the nationalist philosophers, it reduces the individual to a mere cog in the political and economic machinery of institutionalized power.
Nationalism, Socialism and Zionism
Zionism is a brand of European nationalism that emerged alongside the German, Polish, Romanian, Slovakian, Serbian and Ukrainian national movements. [6] Zeev Sternhell describes this type of nationalism as “organic nationalism” and asserts that it developed in a different set of circumstances than western European (ie. French) nationalism, giving it a distinct set of characteristics, not the least of which was a suspicion of the liberalism that radiated out of France after its revolution. According to Sternhell, western European nationalism grew predominantly out of an “expression of an allegiance to a single independent authority”, whereas the eastern European national movements tended to develop as a result of “religion, language, and culture, which were very readily regarded as reflecting biological or racial differences.” [7] The common thread uniting all of these particular brands of nationalism, and Zionism is no exception, is that each one of these groups of national identities was forged in opposition to a dominant and often oppressive state actor, in which the dominant power was easily discerned by its differences (in language, ethnicity, history, etc.) from the nascent national grouping.
This “organic” nationalism provided both the intellectual foundations and the raison d’être for its existence. The nascent ethnic states of Europe forged against the occupation of the French revolutionary empire and other imperial ventures would bear little allegiance to the liberal ideas that emerged as part of the enlightenment, and tribalesque blood allegiances would form the essential characteristics in the legitimation of the state. This tribalism came at the expense of any people identified as stemming from outside of the nation and would eventually lead to a number of nationalist socialist models that were primarily preoccupied with affixing a historical and social territorial destiny to the nation. However, it needs to be understood that these models, while describing themselves as socialist, were actually a far cry from the universalism enshrined in more consistent variants of socialist thought and praxis.
Two streams of this nationalist socialism emerged as German National Socialism and Jewish labour Zionism. The distinguishing characteristic of German nationalism was that it had already produced a state by the time its nationalist socialism had emerged and its nationalist socialism manifested itself as an inherently imperialistic system obsessed with territorial ethnic domination. However, as attested to by Sternhell, the Jewish nationalist socialism “was not a movement of imperial conquest, nor, essentially, a revolt against the heritage of the Enlightenment, but simply a path of rescue for an endangered people.” [8]
Nonetheless, the nationalism that developed in western Europe, and especially that of France which was highly dependent upon an importation of labour to maintain its economic dominance (limiting any potential tribalism of French nationalism), while developed in conjunction with liberalism, was only responsible to the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment insofar as it further justified the state and market institutions. It was no true guarantor of cultural pluralism or individual and collective rights. In fact, just as Zionism can be traced to “organic” nationalism, so “organic” nationalism can be traced to the establishment of the “great” French state. In describing the contradictory nature of German nationalism, Rudolf Rocker argues that “many of the advocates of the German national idea never realized that they owed their apparent liberation not to their German exclusiveness, but to those very “foreign influences” against which their “Germanism” fought with such Berzerker rage.” [9] He concludes that “this misshapen political brat… was nothing more than a greater Prussia come to power, which had changed Germany into a gigantic barracks and with its insane militarism and its definite aims of world political power now assumed the same fateful role which Bonaparte had up to that time played in Europe.” [10] Essentially, the potential for barbarism, imperialism, tyranny, and militarism was not exclusive to German nationalism and was in fact inherited to a great extent (as the “rules of the game”) from the legacy of French colonialism in Germany.
Additionally, the European colonial model was marked by its cohabitation with the legitimating processes of nationalism, whether it was French western nationalism, German “organic” nationalism, or any other variant thereof. Rodinson recognized three basic categories of ethnic-national ideologies and formations. These categories are: unorganized ethnic groups, [11] ethnic-national states, and empires. [12] For the ethnic-national state and the empire, the relationship to colonialism is simply a representation of the political power structure at play and can represent different developmental stages of nationalism. According to Rodinson, Empires are simply
state units within which one ethnic group… dominates others. These are powerful formations which develop an ideology of their own separate from or standing above the ethnic ideologies. If, as sometimes happens, the various ethnic groups tend to fuse within it, then the case of the ethnic-national state re-emerges. [13]
In the context of European nationalism, colonialism developed easily, contradicting only with the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment, and Zionism as an inheritor of this tradition, took to the notions of colonialism with little difficulty. This is evidenced by the complete lack of concern about incorporating a dialogue with the inhabitants of Palestine into any early Zionist strategy. [14]
All of the above-mentioned nationalist dialogues helped to inform, fuel and manifest the unique character of Zionism, which through its colonial experiment later informed the identity and nature of the state of Israel, including its hegemony over the Jewish diaspora. However, Zionism was developed not only as a brand of ethnic nationalism, but was also packaged with the values of the Enlightenment to the degree that it claimed to be socialist and liberal. But the values of universal humanism attached to socialism and liberalism are highly incompatible with the state-tribalism inherent in nationalism and especially that of “organic” ethnic-nationalism, and has lead to a number of glaring contradictions in the mythos of the state of Israel that need to be resolved if there is to be any real sustainable peace in the Middle East.
The Mythos of Liberalism and Socialism in Zionism
The real contradictions of ethnic nationalism and socialism lay not so much in the founding practices of Israel as the founding mythos of Israel. Essentially, the founders of the state, Ben Gurion, Katznelson and the rest of the labour-Zionist camp, were far more influenced by the ethnic tribalism of Aaron David Gordon than the liberalism of Theodore Herzl, who, along with Nordau, never actually reached Palestine. [15] Indeed, if ever there was a doubt between the principles of nationalism and those of socialism within the early Zionist movement (it is irrelevant to even speak of socialism after 1948), the primacy of the nation was never in doubt. Gordon, who abhorred socialism, fully understood the contrary nature of combining two universalisms that stood in contradiction to each other. While socialism declared the common, universality of man, pitted against economic and political manifestations of social power, nationalism emphasized the primacy of a mystical bond of blood and soil.
Gordon grasped also that the commonality between liberalism and socialism was the conception of the individual as the base unit of society and the final object of all social activity. [16] This was contrary to his view that any acceptance of the liberal framework for the individual in society would have meant the end of the Jewish people as an autonomous unit. [17] Rather, he saw the individual as an extension of the nation, from which their very existence was owed. In Gordon’s thinking, the individual was an organic extension of blood from the soil of the motherland and that this set of factors forged the brunt of human identity regardless of an individual’s political or social standing.[18] In this sense, Gordon, and Katznelson after him, saw little use for reason or skepticism, or “excessive cerebralism”. The nation must be sustained through great cultural myths, and religion (even without a belief in God) was an ideal tool for the forging of a national identity.
The mythos approach to nation formation and state-building was embraced by Ben Gurion who was a consummate politician and understood that the mission in Eretz Yisrael needed a morally justifiable façade which it could operate under. The people of a future Zionist state were in need of great formative myths and an essentially moral mandate that justified the project and unified the nation. The concept of nationalist socialism was presented as the ultimately moral face of the Zionist project - a synthesis of socialist humanism and the reclamation of the Jewish soul from the “sickness” of diaspora life.
However, in reality, the process of social transformation was never even considered a viable proposition by the mainstream leadership of the Zionist movement. While collectivization of the land and labour was advocated and romanticized, the truth is that the so-called socialism of the Zionist movement was geared not to the control of productive forces or the transformation of social inequality, but the limitation of “parasitism.” The Jewish bourgeoisie who did not contribute to the hegemony of Jewish labour and the Zionist cause were, as in other nationalist socialist movements, considered “parasites.” All other exploiters of Jewish labour and the thriving Tel Aviv bureaucratic managerial classes were considered integral elements of the national struggle. Thus, when Gordon proclaimed “We all came here to be the nation and to be ourselves. A small minority came here in the name of socialism, bringing its teachings”,[19] he underlined the truth about the Zionist project, exposing the myth of the socialist intent of the nascent state.
The obvious hegemony of nationalism in Zionism is confirmed in the dealings of the labour movement’s organizations throughout its history. Although Gordon despised Ahdut Ha’avoda (The United Labour Party), its leaders, which included Ben Gurion and Katznelson, were profoundly influenced by Gordon and his organization, Hapo’el Hatza’ir (a violently anti-Marxist party). The influence of Anarchists, Marxists, and other serious socialists in the Mapam (United Workers Party), which was controlled by the Mapai (ruled de facto by Ben Gurion), and later the Histadrut (the same essential power structure), was negligible. Moreover, any efforts to incorporate the enterprise into the local population through mutual aid or shared collectivization were extremely marginal and fit under the category of “parasitic” activity. Even the noted pseudo-Marxist Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi framed his famous dismissal of Arab labour around the non-existence of an Arab Palestinian nation,[20] as though this was any answer to the question of the collapse of universal socialist principles. Instead, the question of Arab Palestinian labour was largely ignored until the creation of the Histadrut and the construction of the railroad in Palestine. [21] In this case, the Histadrut was forced to contend with the issue of Arab labour and whether or not they would be allowed to participate in what had been exclusively Jewish labour organizations.
The inability of the Histadrut to effectively deal with issue of Arab workers, also brought up at its founding meeting by members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), exhibits explicitly the subjugation of any real socialist program to the ethno-nationalist agenda of the Zionist policy makers. Furthermore, it underlines the inherent tensions and essentially incompatible natures of socialism and liberalism on one side and ethnic nationalism on the other.
Undeniably, Zionism rested upon the seizure of land that was already inhabited and the overrunning of the indigenous population by a colonial settlers’ movement, who’s mandate remained unquestionably the rulership of the land.[22] The essential tool of this was land settlement and acquisition of land by any means that did not alienate or significantly divide the settler population. The policy of land acquisition for ethnic settlement and national domination has retained its primacy in Israeli politics, albeit modified by changes in global systems, the Palestinian uprising, and the growing peace movement in Israel. However, despite the public spin placed on territorial domination and ethnic cleansing, Israel has remained true to this primary objective of the early Zionist movement.
Zionism as Policy
Unfortunately, when examining Zionism as a form of colonial ethnic-nationalism in Israeli policy, it is rarely, if ever, explicitly stated as a policy objective. Ariel Sharon, like Ben Gurion is a politician that is well prepared to create alternative public goals for a greater agenda. But this does not indicate by any means that the non-stated goals are not policy. Rather, as in politics in any state, any serious long-term policy operates as an assumption that informs all other related policies. Thus, when Sharon addressed the 34th Zionist Conference in Jerusalem in June of 2002, he could have meant a myriad of things in stating “The great Zionist journey will continue and attain its objectives, and, as has been proven time and time again - no obstacle will stand in its way.”[23] His intent could be argued as vehemently as any Christian scholars would debate the intent of the vague sayings of Jesus as recorded in the four gospels. Rather, it is the actions of the state that give its ideology meaning and consistency and therefore an exploration of practice is necessary to determine whether or not the state of Israel has departed from the initial policies elaborated by the early Zionist movement.
With regard to the subjugation of socialism to nationalist objectives, the basic state developmental model in Israel continued to develop along the path of ethnic nationalism. This led to a scenario where the major social institutions consistently moved in a conservative, chauvinistic and reactionary manner, eventually resulting in the dissolution of any dominant socialist ethos. According to Sternhell,
In many respects, the history of the labor movement may be seen as a continual drift to the right, a process in which the more radical principles, those closest to the aspiration of creating a more egalitarian society, were progressively eroded. The series of unifications, which led first to the founding of the Mapai and forty years later to the founding of the Labor Party, all had the same result: an increasing commitment to national goals rather than to those reflecting an aspiration to equality. Thus, from one unification to another, socialist identity was lost.[24]
This slide continues today, where the inheritors of the more reactionary stream of Zionism - Jabotinsky’s gang of thugs, the Revisionists - have moved into the position of political dominance within the state apparatus and have started to dismantle the social safety network and de-tooth the already ineffectual labour movement. As explained by Uri Ram,
In the socio-economic arena, the liberalization policy continued to intensify with every successive government. Since the mid-1980s, Israel has witnessed its first ‘bourgeois revolution’, in which the collective institutions founded by the labour movement fell like a house of cards, and the ‘privatization’ ethos, led by a now robust bourgeois class, took total precedence. This process reached a symbolic peak in 1994, when the Labour movement lost its historic command over the Histadrut…[25]
Coinciding with the deterioration of the labour movement, has been the continuation of a policy of settlement and land acquisition outside of the official borders of Israel - the occupied territories. The necessary result of this enterprise, of course, is the dispossession of the indigenous population of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) and Syria (the Golan Heights). Baruch Kimmerling has described the process of alienating and dispossessing the Arab population[26] as “politicide” and that this process “is a consequence of the 1967 War and, partially, of the very nature and roots of the Zionist movement”.[27]
Ariel Sharon has played a prominent role in establishing Israeli military, settlement, and domestic policy throughout his career and views the Palestinian people as the greatest existential threat to the existence of the ethnic state model that Israel has been founded on. Additionally, he has consolidated political power in Israel to a degree to which it has never previously known. Kimmerling sees Sharon as having transformed Israel, a Prussianesque military regime from its inception, into a “semi-fascist regime”.[28] Having exploited the reaction to the alienation of the Mizrahi (non-European, aka non-white) Jews by the traditionally dominant Ashkenazi (white European) elite, Sharon, along with his Likud predecessors, rode a wave of unprecedented electoral popularity at the polls, establishing a primarily right-wing Parliament. This has lead to the infusion of extremist neo-Zionist[29] parties into the discourse surrounding Israeli policy. The educational system has been saturated with neo-Zionist textbooks, partially as a result of this process and partly as a result of tireless activism by this fundamentalist subcategory of Zionism.[30]
Additionally, as a result of the hegemony of ethnic nationalism in the Israeli educational and socialization process, the dominant attitudes of the public are loathe to sacrifice the specific ethnic character of the state (or the state itself) for any security or for the realization of the liberal ideals that the state was allegedly founded on, should they come in conflict with each other.[31]
At the same time, land acquisition, the centerpiece of Zionist strategy, remains at the core of Israeli policy. This is attested to by a number of factors, not the least of which was the (generally) consistent acceleration of settlement in the occupied territories since their occupation in 1967 and the provision of state-based incentives for settlement. This process has gone through various stages since the War of 1967, influenced by international and domestic negotiations, but the state of Israel has consistently been able to increase the number of settlers in a country that was not legally theirs to control. In times of settlement-freeze, as in the terms agreed to in the US-backed Roadmap, the Israeli state puts its efforts into aiding the expansion of existing settlements[32] and often continues to legalize and establish new settlements under the context of “security” or providing resources to Israeli citizens, as was the case when the Sharon regime recently legalized several new settlements. Viewed in context of Zionism, this was always the method of annexing land and exerting de facto political control over territory. According to the Israeli human rights group, B’Tselem,
The Israeli administration has applied most aspects of Israeli law to the settlers and the settlements, thus effectively annexing them to the State of Israel. This has taken place although in formal terms the West Bank is not part of the State of Israel, and the law in effect there is Jordanian law and military legislation. This annexation has resulted in a regime of legalized separation and discrimination. This regime is based on the existence of two separate legal systems in the same territory, with the rights of individuals being determined by their nationality.[33]
Lending additional significance to this perspective is the factor that there has not been any non-occupational or imperial control of Palestine in the last several hundred years and that this has enabled the Zionist enterprise dramatically. A change in this scenario would likely put an end to this strategy and would convert Israeli policy from a settler-colonial dimension to focus on the potential of regional hegemony, something the Israeli state is highly disadvantaged at due to the hostility of the neighbouring states. Israel’s only potential options to expand its power-base at that point will be integration with the local economies and politics or imperialism.
For Sharon, however, this dilemma is compounded by the ideological and practical desire to “finish” the Palestinian problem and acquiring as much land as possible so that any possible Palestinian state will be a non-actor in Israeli politics. This, for all intents and purposes, harkens back to the arguments made by the exceptionally lucid, yet morally suspect, Vladimir Jabotinsky, who called for an Iron Wall (of course, Jabotinsky meant a metaphorical wall) that would crush the Palestinian spirit into submission, accompanied, one must assume, by an implied ethnic cleansing. Perhaps not so ironically, the wall[34] project that Sharon inherited from the previous regimes (indicating that the positions of Labour and Likud regarding basic Zionist precepts are not so divergent) is being utilized to produce similar results to Jabotinsky’s ideological wall, as well as serving as a de facto annexation of Palestinian land. B’Tselem describes this scenario in the organization’s assessment of the political context of the establishment of the wall:
Even if we accept Israel’s claim that the only way to prevent attacks is to erect a barrier, Israel is required to select the route that results in the fewest possible human rights violations. The planned route almost totally ignores this principle and is based on extraneous considerations which have little, if anything, to do with the security of Israeli civilians. One of the government’s primary considerations was inclusion of as many settlements as possible west of the barrier in order to increase the likelihood of their annexation into Israel.[35]
The process of divesting the Palestinian elites from the potential of forming a viable state is facilitated by the start and stop nature of the “peace” negotiations. Conspicuously missing from these so-called peace initiatives that have been underway since even before Oslo, is the possibility of a one-state solution. This is where the dominance of ethnic nationalism underscores the major contradictions between the “democratic” values and the ethnic character of the Israeli state. As long as the character of the state is based on the definition of the nation as an ethnic group, bound to the soil through blood and other fantastic mythologies, there can be no ultimate reconciliation with the individual-social framework of liberalism that celebrates plurality. The ultimate offence to the nature of the Zionist enterprise is the decommissioning of the national character of the state in favour of liberal or socialist values. While the majority of Israel’s population remains Jewish, the state can make such bold claims as being “the only democracy in the Middle East”, but as soon as that majority no longer exists, Israel returns to its ultimate existential dilemma: is it an ethnic state or is it a liberal state?
Conclusion
I would venture to say, that at these crossroads, the two state solution is but a minor, temporary remedy for far greater problems that will continue to plague the Israeli people as time marches forward and they will inevitably be forced to make the decision to either become subjects of an emerging ethnic fascism or to undo the social damage done by the legacy of Zionism and move towards a liberal, socialist and pluralistic coexistence with their neighbours.
Of course, the same responsibility is incumbent upon the Palestinians to dispense with their own brand of nationalism, but it should be noted that the Palestinian national identity was at least partially forged against the framework of Zionism. Additionally, as in any scenario where there is a distinct imbalance of power between concerned parties, the responsibility of ending a cycle of perpetual conflict resides with the stronger giving way to the weaker in exchange for nothing other than moral self-affirmation. However, as evidenced by the global feminist movement, as well as the South African anti-apartheid and the American civil rights movements, the ultimate responsibility to “get it done right” if at all, is transferred to the repressed population to force the issue upon, and inform the oppressor “by any means necessary”.
The people of Israel, having been faced with the reality of multifarious forms of resistance to not only the occupation, but essentially Zionism as a policy of Eretz Yisrael - and later Israel - from its inception to the integrated world of today, are capable of making a leap away from the chauvinistic nature of their state and forging a real peace, but only if Zionism and nationalism is dispensed with once and for all. Whether this happens with or without two states is incidental. The truth remains that the Israeli state, with its indispensable ethnic mandate and its vicious oligarchy, has been leading the people on a destructive path since even before its inception, killing the souls of “its” people (the alleged nation) and devastating all those in its path.
As exhibited in the new global activism, collectivism and spirit of co-operativism that has resurged since the late 1960s, the rapid forms of mass communication and transport have drawn the world together in such a manner that the universal humanism of liberalism and socialism is an ever-increasing possibility. However, the tribalistic ethnic state model has proven throughout its history just how destructive and misanthropic it can actually be. The creativity and diversity of culture, so valued by the Jewish diaspora before it was co-opted by the Zionist movement can be restored by a return to the celebration of pluralism and a rejection of the Jewish monoculture forced on it by national meta-narratives.[36]
Bibliography
Brenner, Lenni. The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (London: Zed Books, 1984)
Carey, Roane and Jonathan Shanin, eds. The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent. (New York: The New Press, 2002)
Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians. (London, New York: Verso, 2003)
Lockman, Zachary. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001)
Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003)
Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Michael E. Coughlin, Publisher, 1978, 1947)
Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983)
Rodinson, Maxime. Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Pathfinder, 1973)
Shlaim, Avi. War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History, Revised and Updated (New York: Penguin, 1995)
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Notes
1. Maxime Rodinson, in addressing what he called Judeo-centrism, was compelled to answer allegations of self-loathing or denial of Jewish heritage, further asserting “Nationalism and religion proclaim our duty to rally to their banners, and accuse us of treason and cowardice if we fail to do so.” Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983) p. 10
2. Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983) p. 148
3. It is my belief, as an anarchist, that political boundaries operate to continually disrupt the organic flow of labour and cultural interchange and therefore are not legitimate in any context other than provincial outlines, useful for mailing addresses and such. Security concerns can be addressed in any manner of forms, but borders are typically maintained for preserving privileges of states and national economic exploitation, and therefore do not actually increase the security of the people on either side of the border, but actually act to intensify dangers by perpetuating state-based inequalities and national hatreds.
4. I include the term “identifies with” here because it is quite common for people to identify with their own oppressors when they are threatened by what they have been trained to view as “external” enemies. The manufacture of an “other” for the purposes is a common political tool to maintain an artificial semi-consensus and obedience to a dominant group within a society.
5. For a detailed argument of this, see Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Michael E. Coughlin, Publisher, 1978, 1947). Especially noteworthy is Chapter 12 pp. 200-212.
6. Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 10
7. Ibid. pp. 10-11
8. Ibid. p. 27
9. Rocker, Rudolf. Nationalism and Culture. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Michael E. Coughlin, Publisher, 1978, 1947) p. 225
10. Ibid. p. 226
11. The term “unorganized ethnic groups” is misleading and inaccurate for two major reasons. First, it implies that any meaningful ethnic organization can only occur on a state level or higher, intrinsically tying ethnicity to militarism. Second, it suggests that ethnic groups are inherently unrealized nationalities, disregarding the fluidity of ethnic and cultural development over time. The Jewish diaspora in the 19th century in all its parts was a far cry from the Jewish diaspora of the 5th century and represented different norms and tendencies in different places. Rodinson’s category is mistaken and shows an ideological weakness in the Marxism of the author rather than any flaw in his categorization of ethnic-nationalism.
12. Rodinson, Maxime. Cult, Ghetto, and State: the persistence of the Jewish question. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983) pp. 119-120
13. Ibid. p. 120
14. “early Zionist perceptions of, and attitudes toward, the land and its indigenous Arab majority were profoundly influenced not only by a radically new nationalist appropriation of Jewish history and culture but also by the specific historical conjuncture within which Zionism emerged in Europe—the heyday of colonialism.” Lockman, Zachary. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
15. See Chapter One of Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) pp. 47 - 73
16. Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 59
17. Ibid. p. 55
18. Ibid.
19. Gordon, Aaron David. “To My Defeated Spiritual Brethren” (1919) in Writings p. 412 as quoted from Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)
20. Lockman, Zachary. Op Cit.
21. Ibid. see Chapter 2 “Labor Zionism and the Arab Working Class, 1920-1929″
22. For a more detailed exposition of this position see Rodinson, Maxime. Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (New York: Pathfinder, 1973). Subsequent analysis of the same issue has been prolific. The post-Zionist dialogue is rife with examples of this form of argumentation.
23. PM Sharon Addresses the 34th Zionist Congress. Jerusalem, 20 June 2002
24. Sternhell, Zeev. translated by David Maisel. The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism and the Making of the Jewish State. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 34
25. Ram, Uri. “From Nation-State to Nation—–State: Nation, History and Identity Struggles in Jewish Israel” in Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003) pp. 26-27
26. “Arab” is of course an insufficient terminology to describe the “other” in this discourse, as what it actually refers to is the indigenous non-Jewish and non-Zionist Jewish population. This argument has often been utilized to assert the lack of a true Palestinian identity and invalidate any Palestinian nationalism. This is incorrect however, as what it actually indicates is the homogenizing nature of nationalist hegemony. Not only has the Zionist program forced a meta-narrative upon the Jewish populations of the world, but it has also done great harm to Palestinian diversity by forcing different factions into a conflict over the right to impose and define a homogeneous Palestinian identity.
27. Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians. (London, New York: Verso, 2003) p. 4
28. Ibid. p. 5
29. I would tend to argue (against a number of post-Zionist authors) that neo-Zionism is by and large a manifestation of extremist right-wing ethnic nationalism ideologically influenced by the revisionism of the earlier Zionist movement, brought about by Likud’s partial shift to traditional Zionism and inability to bring the full revisionist program into the mainstream discourse without alienating its previous coalitions.
30. Pappé, Ilan. “The Square Circle: The Struggle for Survival of Traditional Zionism” in Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003) pp. 56-57
31. See Ghanem, As’ad, “Zionism, Post-Zionism and Anti-Zionism in Israel: Jews and Arabs in Conflict Over the Nature of the State” in Nimni, Ephraim, ed. The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to Israeli Fundamentalist Politics. (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003)
32. See “Fact Sheet” The Palestine Monitor.
33. “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank” B’Tselem.
34. Or separation barrier, or fence, or whatever other euphemism is employed to make it sound innocuous.
35. “The Separation Barrier”, B’Tselem.
36. For an advancement on this position see Nimni, Ephraim “From Galut to T’fusoth: Post-Zionism and the Dis>
